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THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN: ITS ORGANIZATION
AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Hiroyuki Ikeba, M. A
Western Michigan University, 1995
This study analyzes the behavior of the politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party
of Japan (LDP) and the decision making process of the LDP. This study draws heavily
on Japanese language sources as well as interviews with leading Japanese Diet persons.
The characteristics of Japanese culture are explained by introducing the works of
three scholars. They are: Ruth Benedict, Chie Nakane, and Takeo Doi. It was discovered
that the relationships among LDP Diet persons and between supporters and Diet persons
are based on traditional societal norms. Furthermore, it was found that the decision
making process of the LDP was in harmony with the most significant Japanese cultural
value--harmony. Because the organizational basis of the LDP, the factions, and the
koenkai (personal support groups) are sustained by the behaviors of the LDP politicians
and supporters, these informal organizations gave the LDP its organizational strength.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Significance ofthe Study ofthe Liberal Democratic Party ofJapan
Japanese politics has often been said to be difficult to understand. Undoubtedly,
this impression was a byproduct ofthe complexity ofthe Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
government. The LDP has been deeply involved in Japan's policy making process for
about 40 years. Although the one party rule by the LDP collapsed in 1993, it is important
to study LDP politics for the following two reasons. First, the LDP is still the most
influential party within the current Murayama administration.

Thirteen out of 20

ministerial positions are held by the LDP. In addition, LDP Diet persons are the largest
force in the parliament. As of 1995, 206 out of506 Diet persons in the lower house were
from the LDP, while 95 out of252 Diet persons in the upper house were from the LDP.
Second, LDP politics tend to be described as complex, opaque, and unique. However,
these characteristics have not been clearly explained (Nakano, 1993).
This study will clarify the unique characteristics of LDP politics which have not
changed since the formation of the LDP in 1955. Before explaining the theme of this
study, the philosophy of the LDP will be examined as well as how the LDP maintained
its rule.

1
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The Emergence of the LDP and Its Philosophy
The Occupation Period and the Conservatives
Before discussing the LDP, it is necessary to explain how conservative politicians
survived the dramatic socioeconomic changes during the occupation period following
World War II. In September 1945, the Japanese government formally surrendered to the
allied forces thereby ending World War II. General Douglas MacArthur was appointed
as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to act as the agent of the
United States in Japan. The Allied Powers ruled Japan from 1945 to 1952 when the
Treaty of Peace at San Francisco formally ended the occupation.
The policies of SCAP consisted of two goals: the demilitarization and
democratization of Japan.

Demilitarization was a simple problem compared with

democratization. It involved the conversion of Japan's arms-making capacity to peaceful
uses and the repatriation of Japanese military personnel from other countries. All these
tasks were accomplished by the end of 1948. In addition, Article 9, the so-called peace
clause, was written into Japan's new constitution. It renounced war and denied the
nation's right to use force as a means of settling international disputes. This article has
been effective in applying constraints on the growth of military power in postwar Japan.
Another major goal of the occupation, the democratization of Japan, was more
complicated and difficult to achieve. In 1945, intensive efforts were made to revise
Japan's political structure. A series of directives guaranteed the Japanese people certain
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fundamental human rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right
to assembly. A new constitution for Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and
went into effect on May 3, 194 7. It reduced the status of the emperor from a sovereign
ruler to a symbolic representation of the Japanese state and people. Furthermore, a
British-style parliamentary system was introduced and women were given the right to
vote.
In order to insure that these institutional changes would be successful, some
fundamental socioeconomic changes had to take place in order to democratize Japan.
The dissolution of the zaibatsu (the great family-dominated holding companies) and the
implementation of agricultural land reform were the most significant changes. Those
reforms were also important for conservative politicians because the zaibatsu and
landlords were the most important supporters of the conservative politicians.
The dissolution of the zaibatsu was aimed at equalizing the wealth in the country.
The zaibatsu were the giant family-dominated financial and industrial combines that
dominated the Japanese economy between the Meiji period (1868-1912) and World War
II. The concentration of economic power in the zaibatsu was considered a obstacle in the
development of Japanese democracy.
The prewar conservative parties, however, were primarily assisted by the two
largest zaibatsu, the Mitsui, and the Mitsubishi (Masumi, 1992). The influence of the
zai batsu was so great that the influence and money from them corrupted the parties
(Richardson & Franagan, 1984). Moreover, politicians were ranked by their ability to
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raise funds from the zaibatsu (Masumi, 1992). There is little doubt that prewar
government policies were largely influenced by the zaibatsu. "In the prewar period,
political activity was concentrated at the top of the business community so that the full
economic power of the zaibatsu could be felt" (Richardson & Franagan, 1984).
The dissolution of the zaibatsu after World War II eliminated the major source of
funding for the conservative politicians. However, the close relationships between
conservative politicians and the business community did not change even after the
zaibatsu were dissolved.

The conservative politicians could still establish close

relationships with wealthy individuals and enterprises (Fukui, 1970, and Rothacher 1993).
For example, Ichiro Hatoyama received money from the nationalist ideologue, Yoshio
Kodama, and built the Liberal Party with those funds in 1945. In addition, frequent
scandals involving conservative politicians in the 1940s and 1950s indicates they and the
business community sustained their intimate relationships. From 1947 to 1954 there were
22 scandals. The most notable of these was the Shipbuilding Scandal of 1954. In this
case, 105 conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen were arrested for
receiving and giving bribes.
It should be noted that behind the re-establishment of close ties between
conservative politicians and the business community, was the 1948 change in the U.S.
occupation policy. Following the communist victory in China in October 1949 and
increase in cold war tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States,
Washington increasingly lost interest in radically reforming Japan (Campbell & Noble,
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1993). Instead, the United States took the position that it was better to rebuild the
Japanese economy as part ofthe western block. Thus, in 1952, former zaibatsu gathered
together again as loose corporate groupings called keiretsu.
Another major goal of the occupation was land reform. This reform aimed at
redistributing land holdings shifting ownership from landlords to tenants. It also aimed
at broadening the democratic base through the creation ofa class ofyeoman farmers.
At the end ofWorld War II, almost 50% of the Japanese people lived in largely
rural areas. Ofthese, about one-half to two-thirds of Japan's arable land was worked by
tenants (Fukui, 1970). Tenants paid rents that averaged as much as 60 % of the crop.
In fact, landlordism was structured on the feudal ownership of land catering to a small
number oflandlords who hindered the democratization process. Moreover, rural poverty
and discontent had contributed greatly to the rise ofmilitarism in prewar Japan.
A land reform bill was imposed in 1946. The bill placed a ceiling on land holdings
limiting landlords to an average of about seven and one-half acres. Those possessing
larger holdings were ordered to sell their excess to the government, which, in tum, resold
the land to the tenants. As a result, the number oftenant farmers decreased dramatically,
and percentage ofcultivator-owned paddy land increased from 55.7% in 1947 to 88.9%
in 1949 (Campbell & Noble, 1993). As a result ofthis reform, the conservative politicians
lost their old support base, however, in 1946 and 1949 elections they developed
alternative support groups. In the 1946 election of the lower house, the conservatives
obtained 51.3% of the Diet seats, and in the 1949 election of the lower house, the
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conservatives obtained 64.8% of the Diet seats (Hirose, 1994). The percentage of the
Diet seats obtained by the conservatives increased significantly from the election of 1946
to the election of 1949 even though the power of the landlords declined.
Two reasons account for this fact. First, even before the prewar conservative
party leaders were removed from their party posts, the organization of conservative
parties had been fully re-established (Fukui, 1970). In 1945, despite the U.S. occupation
of Japan, two major conservative parties, the Liberal party and the Progressive Party,
were formed. Moreover, these parties were organized along lines that were almost
identical with the prewar conservative parties. Each had a president, an executive council,
a secretary general, and a political affairs research council (PARC).
Second, the conservative politicians successfully reestablished their support base
by organizing the Koenkai (personal support groups). In the prewar period, the
conservative politicians were totally dependent on landlords in the election.

As

mentioned, the land reform had destroyed these support groups. Ever resourceful, the
conservative politicians built a different type of support group or koenkai which is
explained in Chapter 5. It is now clear that the conservative politicians moved quickly in
adapting to the dramatic socioeconomic changes wrought by the occupation. Moreover,
their sagacity and determination soon produced the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
formed in 1955, and the LDP constructed a network of support groups which sustained
its one party rule for 3 8 years.
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The Emergence of the LDP and Its Philosophy
The LDP was formed in 1955, through the merger of the two major conservative
parties of the time, the Japan Democratic Party led by Ichiro Hatoyama, and the Liberal
Party led by Taketora Ogata and earlier by Prime.Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The
reunification of the Japan Socialist Party, the English name of which was changed in 1991
to the Social Democratic Party of Japan, was a major reason for this merger. Not only
conservative politicians but also the business community, important supporters of the
conservatives, felt it was necessary for conservative parties to be united in order to
maintain a conservative rule.
Throughout the history of the LDP, the philosophy and ideology of the LDP have
been vague and flexible (Hayes, 1992, and Kishimoto, 1988). When the LDP was
formed, the LDP characterized itself only, as: (a) a national political party, (b) an
advocate of pacifism, (c) a democratic party that rejects communism, (d) a party that
respects the parliamentary system, (e) a progressive party, and (f) a force aiming for
realization of a welfare state (Rothacher, 1993).
According to LDP thinking, the lack of a systematic philosophy and ideology is
the strength of the party. In a private document of the LDP, Nihon no seitou (The
political parties in Japan) (1979), which was compiled for the purpose of educating party
members, the following statement was made:
The LDP is the party that has no ideology. On the surface, it seems that
the LDP lacks a clear philosophy and principle. However, because of this
lack of an ideology, the party can include various kinds of opinions. The
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LDP does not care what kinds of thoughts, creeds, and faiths the party
members have. . . . "Why does the LDP maintain unity?" "Because the
LDP has coherent human relationships" (p. 161).
The organizing principle that unites the LDP is not ideology but the interpersonal
relationships formed among politicians and between politicians and their supporters. The
purpose of this study is not to detail LDP relationships but rather, to develop an
understanding of the significant influences that shape the behavior of Japan's ruling
politicians. Familiarization with LDP behavior also helps explain the long term stability
of the party.
LDP Dominance
There are three explanations for the question, "Why did LDP one party rule last
for 38 years?" The first explanation is that the LDP maintained its unity as one party
since 1955, whereas the opposition parties never united to form a coalition (See,
Okimoto, 1989, Rothacher, 1993, and Stockwin, 1988). In the 1950s, there were only
two opposition parties: the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the Japan
Communist Party (JCP). In the 1970s, there were five opposition parties: the SDPJ, the
JCP, the Komei Party (the Clean Government Party), the Democratic Socialist Party
(DSP), and the Social Democratic League (SDL).
This explanation is persuasive to some extent, but not crucial. The crucial
question is why the LDP has been successful in avoiding fragmentation. A second
explanation addresses this question.
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The second explanation is that LDP Diet persons could obtain benefits by
belonging to the ruling party. For example, by being members of the ruling party, LDP
Diet persons obtained a great deal of information about policy matters from bureaucrats
and hence developed considerable expertise in policy matters. This relationship between
the LDP members and the government civil servants will be explained in Chapter 3. In
addition, LDP Diet persons obtained considerable financial assistance from the business
community through their faction leaders (Campbell, 1989).
LDP Diet persons who left the party, also yielded their financial benefits. The
failure of the New Liberal Club (NLC) offers evidence of this relationship. In 1976, one
upper house and five lower house members of the LDP led by Yohei Kono left the LDP
to form the NLC. They criticized the LDP for its corruption. Immediately after its
formation, there was an "NLC boom" in membership and the Diet persons in the club
increased to 17. Ten years later, however, the NLC lost popularity and their number of
Diet persons was reduced to six. The others all rejoined the LDP. The most significant
reason for the NLC loss of popularity was its difficulty in raising political funds that could
attract strong candidates (Curtis, 1989).
This raises still another question. "Why did the LDP hold a majority of the seats
in the Diet for 38 years?" Neither the first nor the second explanations can fully answer
this question, hence we can look for a third explanation.
The third explanation is that the LDP maintained its rule because it always
changed its policy according to the social and economic conditions of the day (See,
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Curtis, 1989, Okimoto, 1988, Pempel, 1982, Pempel, 1990, and Ryu en, 1994). Given its
capacity to adapt a variety of policies, the LDP attracted people in every occupation and
in every social class. In this sense, the LDP was a "catch-all party" (Ryu en, 1993).
In the 1960s, LDP policies were aimed at achieving high economic growth to
satisfy the business community but which also improved the standard of living of average
Japanese citizens. Pr~ e Minister Hayato Ikeda's policy to dQuble the national income,

implemented in 1960, was a typical example of satisfying several sections of society at the
same time. The plan had as its goal the doubling of the national economy in 10 years, and
that goal was attained in 1968, two years earlier than the initial plan.
During this period of high economic growth, the increased national budget made
it possible to expand public works and increase financial support for farmers. Such LDP
economic policies contributed to the achievement of a relatively equitable income
distribution through investments in the less developed regions and in weak industries
(Curtis, 1989).
The LDP also improved the medical and health insurance system. As a result,
since 1961, all Japanese citizens and aliens resident in Japan have been covered under one
of six alternative health insurance plans. It should be noted that the extension of the
welfare system was a major program of the socialists, and the LDP seized the opportunity
to exploit it for their own purposes.
In the late 1960s, the LDP also began to assist small and medium-sized
enterprises which had been important support groups for the JCP. That assistance
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included making lenient tax provisions, ignoring large-scale tax evasion, and providing
special loans (Okimoto, 1989).
These are some examples of the policies that were adopted by the LDP.
Flexibility in executing these policies added to the strength of the LDP. However, Krauss
and Ishida (1989) point out the LDP's adaptability to the changing socioeconomic
condition was a direct result of the strong competition offered by the opposition parties.
Thus, in the 1970s, the LDP placed a priority on environmental issues because "It [the
LDP] felt itself in very real competition with the opposition parties" (p. 334). But while
the LDP overwhelmed its opposition in Diet elections, the LDP actually ignored the
consequences of widespread pollution. In fact, pollution was already a serious problem
in Japan in the 1950s, and meaningful environmental policies were not implemented until
the 1970s (Masumi, 1992).

But even with the enactment of the Pollution

Countermeasures Basic Law, little was done to protect the environment because a
rigorous program would have slowed economic development (Campbell & Noble, 1993).
It was not until the Kakuei Tanaka Administration (1972-1974) that the problem of
pollution was seriously addressed. The Pollution Related Health Damage Compensation
Law of 1973 was the result of this effort. Compensation benefits to those most affected
by environmental degradation included medical care allowances, compensation payments
to survivors, and child compensation allowances. By implementing this law, the LDP
appeased an angry citizenry, but it took almost 20 years for the government to take
effective action.
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While noting LDP successes it is just as important to cite the party's failures,
especially the frequency and magnitude of LDP corruption. LDP Diet persons were
indicted in 10 different bribery cases from 1957 to 1992. These included a 1957 case
involving compensation for people who lost their homes due to the construction of a
hydroelectric project. Corruption was also proven in an anti-prostitution law case in
1957, in the Toubu Railway Company Case in 1961, in the Osaka taxi case in 1967, in the
Lockheed Scandal Case in 1976, in the case related to raw silk industries in 1986, in the
Recruit Scandal Case in 1989, and in the Sagawa Kyubin Case in 1992. All of these
corruption cases were directly or indirectly related to political donations and the unfair
use of political power or influence. Every time a corruption case was uncovered, the LDP
Administration suffered a loss of popularity. Nevertheless, the party managed to maintain
its position of power for several decades in spite of severe criticism in the press. The
question that this raises is how the LDP survived for so long under such intense public
scrutiny. For an answer to this and other questions we need to return to the behavior of
LDP politicians and the interpersonal relationships between politicians and their
supporters. This is the theme of this study.
Theme and Questions
This study will answer the following questions and explain the durability of the
LDP:
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1.

What patterns of Japanese political culture influence the behavior of the

Japanese people ?
2.

What cultural/psychological characteristics influence the LDP decision

making process ?
3.

How do LDPDiet persons collect and spend money for political purposes?

4.

What is the importance of the factions and the koenkai (personal support

groups) to the LDP?
Answers to these questions will help to explain current political and social
conditions in Japan, and in particular the role of the LDPin Japanese society.

CHAPTER II
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW OF JAPANESE CULTURE AND LDP POLITICS
Importance of the Study of Culture
Political culture has a vital importance in the study of politics. Plato argued that
"governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the
one as there are of the other" (Jowett, 1936, p. 445). In spite of the profound insight of
this ancient Greek philosopher, later social scientists have generally misunderstood the
importance of political culture.
It has been an intellectual tradition of social scientists to analyze society or human
behavior from the standpoint of Western experience. Therefore, as is often argued, some
approaches to the study of politics have limits when applying their theories to Asian
societies. Marxism and the rational approach are examples of them. Marx thought that
nineteenth-century society had been sustained by a social system which leads to the
bourgeois exploitation of workers. As the exploitation becomes severe, the struggle
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie becomes intense. As a result, these societies
will be overthrown by a proletarian revolution.
Yet, when his thought is applied to Japan, his ideas are unrealistic. Japan has been
characterized as a hierarchical society. However, Japanese society has less social unrest
or social alienation compared with other industrialized countries (De Vos, 1984).
14
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As will be discussed in this chapter, there are stable, interdependent relationships
between subordinates and superiors in Japanese hierarchical social organizations
regardless of the existence of social class. Marx's thought does not seem to be applicable
in Japan. By examining Japanese culture, it is apparent that conflict is not inevitable in
human society.
Rational approaches are also antagonistic to political culture studies. For rational
approaches, history, psychology, and cultural context have no explanatory power because
the political scientist who employs a rational theory thinks that a political actor is rational.
However, it should be noticed that "there is no universally accepted paradigm" (Isaak,
1985, p. 192). All of the approaches of political science have merits and defects. Thus
rational approaches do not suffice, and as such, each approach should make up for the
shortcomings of the other.
Another criticism from the rational approach is that political culture is based on
"fuzzy thinking and sloppy explanation" (Pye, 1985, p. 20). In order to answer this
criticism, it is necessary to consider the stability of political culture. If a consistent feature
of political culture in one country can be found, then it would be significant in establishing
behavior patterns or in shaping public opinion. Pye states:
People cling to their cultural ways not because of some vague feelings for
their historical legacies and traditions, but because their culture is part and
parcel of their personalities-and we know from psychoanalysis how hard
(and expensive) it is to change a personality (p. 20).
However, it is important to distinguish the differences between the stable side of
political culture and changeable side of it. On the latter side, political moods involving
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trust in political incumbents and confidence in political and social institutions are quite
changeable. On the stable side, the most persistent aspects are attitudes, identities, and
value commitments associated with ethnicity, nationality, and religion (Almond, 1990).
Turning to Japanese culture, it is important to notice that despite two major
incidents (the Meiji Restoration and World War II) which brought a political
transformation, Japanese society has kept many of its historic features. Johnson ( 1993)
argues that there has been a high degree of consistency in traditional behavioral norms
concerned with regulating social behavior for the past 120 years. This consistent and
stable side of Japanese culture will be discussed in this thesis.
An examination of the following three books will reveal certain behavioral patterns
and cultural traits of the Japanese people. These behavioral patterns and cultural traits
have sustained Japanese society since World War II. This review will explain the
continuity of Japanese culture.
The books are: Benedict, R. (1946). The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. MA:
The Riverside Press; Nakane, C. (1970). Japanese Society. (C. Nakane, Trans.).
Berkeley: University of California Press. (Original work published 1967); Doi, T. (1973).
The Anatomy of Dependence. (J. Bester, Trans.). Tokyo: Kodansha. (Original work
published 1971). A review of these sources will show that analyzing Japanese culture is
vital to understanding the unique characteristics of Japanese politics, regardless of the fact
that many political scientists studying Japan tend to ignore the cultural explanation of
Japanese politics.
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The Work of Ruth Benedict and Behaviors ofLDP Politicians
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, written in 1946, contains a comprehensive
description ofJapanese society. Although anthropologist Ruth Benedict wrote this book
without doing field research in Japan, this book has been one ofthe most thorough studies
on Japanese culture.
Benedict (1946) studied Japanese society on the premise that "the most isolated
bits ofbehavior have some systematic relation to each other" (p.11). Benedict suggests
that all economic, religious and political behaviors are related to each other because they
are sustained by the same rationale. All men who have acquired the value systems of their
society must behave according to those values.

"Economic behavior, family

arrangements, religious rites and political objections therefore become geared into one
another" (Benedict, 1946, p.12). It can be assumed that if political behavior was contrary
to the value systems, it would result in chaos within the political system.
Benedict studied many aspects ofJapanese society. Among these, two important
aspects for understanding Japanese politics will be discussed here. The hierarchical
structure of Japanese society and the importance of group consensus building. The
psychological characteristics which sustain hierarchical society will also be discussed.
In her attempt to grasp Japanese society, Benedict stressed the hierarchical
structure ofJapanese society. One is expected to know one's place in society because this
results in a sense of security within the society. In every area of society such as
government and industry, carefully separated hierarchies exist and everybody is expected
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to behave according to the values associated with the hierarchical position which he/she
occupies.
The family is the place where every Japanese learns the norm of hierarchy first,
and one applies it in society. The father is, in this case, responsible for the household.
However, it is important to note that he does not have unconditional authority in spite of
his highest position in the hierarchy.
A family council is a typical example which explains power in a hierarchical
system. When a very important affair occurs in a family, the head of the family calls a
family council to discuss the matter. In this discussion, all of the members of the family
are involved, and persons in a lower position such as a younger brother or a wife
sometimes sway the verdict. The head of a family does not exert power arbitrarily.
Benedict states (1946):
The Japanese do not learn in their home life to value arbitrary authority,
and the habit of submitting to it easily is not fostered. Submission to the
will of the family is demanded in the name of a supreme value in which,
however onerous its requirements, all of them have a stake. It is
demanded in the name of a common loyalty (p. 55).
Also important is the fact that the head of the family is faced with great difficulties if he
acts without regard for group opinion.
Although Benedict did not apply this norm of the family to other social
organizations, it is important to do it in order to confirm her basic assumption, that is, that
"the most isolated bits of behavior have some systematic relation to each other "
(Benedict, 1946, p. 11). As can be seen in the Japanese family, the decision is not always
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made by the top-down system in other social organizations in Japan. The Ringi system
is the most typical Japanese decision making system. In that system, a decision is made
by the use of circular letters that are commonly used in Japanese companies and
bureaucratic organizations. This system is a group-oriented, bottom-up, consensus
making process that is often initiated by middle management personnel rather than by
senior executives. As the circular letter moves from one group to another, each group
can participate in the decision making process. Complaints and objections are dealt with
through bargaining, compromise, or accommodation at each step of the process. Thus
the final decision that emerges from this process can be effectively implemented, because
the decision is a product from the process of group interaction rather than being made by
an individual leader.
The consensus of a group is more important than the leadership of a head of a
group even in a critical condition such as a war. The Manchuria Incident is a case in
point. This was the conquest and pacification of Manchuria by the Guandong Army,
Japan's field army in Manchuria, from September 1931 to January 1933. During the night
of September 18-19 1931, the Guandong Army attacked the Chinese army. This was
a fatal moment for Japan because it propelled the nation to foreign confrontation.
The amazing thing about this is that the commander of Guandong Army
Lieutenant General Honjo was not involved in planning the attack. He was ignorant of
it until the battle started. The attack was planned and led by lower-level officers. In other
words, the Guandong Army invaded Machuria without a decicive leader like Hitler or
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Mussolini (Pye, 1985). The lower-ranking officiers formulated a consensus within the
Army, then they were able to push their own strategy (Komuro, 1992). The General
Headquarters of the Army ignored the order from the September 19th Cabinet meeting
not to expand this battle. More importantly, the Emperor expressed his support for this
Cabinet decision (Irie, 1992).
This fact indicates that the Guandong Army's deed was unconstitutional. The
Constitution ofthe Empire ofJapan, which was in effect from November 29 1880 to May
2 1947, stated that "the Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of
Emperors unbroken for ages extent" (Article 1). Sovereign power was clearly vested in
the Emperor.
As mentioned above, in spite of the hierarchical order in Japanese society, strong
leadership can rarely exist in Japan. On the contrary, lower-ranking persons often play
a significant role in a group.

Their position gives them advantages in forming a

consensus.
In Japanese society, a leader has to be a person who can understand group
members' feeling and can coordinate various opinions. If a leader wants to determine
policy by his own will, and impose it on his followers, it is necessary for him to go
through nemawashi which means that prior to expressing his opinion, he must make
contact with members of a group to explain his ideas and create a consensus.
Considering the case of the normalization of Japan-China relations in 1972 it is
useful to understand the importance of consensus building. The normalization was done

21
through the leadership effort of the then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka (Minor, 1985).
However, Tanaka made an effort to create a consensus in the government before starting
negotiations with China. A diary of Akiko Sato, who was the secretary and mistress of
Tanaka, provided information about the behavior of Tanaka. In the entry for July 7
1972 when Tanaka was inaugurated as prime minister, Sato (1994) writes that in the
night, Tanaka invited the Director of the China Division of Foreign Ministry, Hashimoto
to a first-class Japanese restaurant and asked him for his cooperation on the normalization
with China. It is important to note that the first person whom Tanaka asked for
cooperation was a middle-class government officer. He knew that this officer was a key
to creating a consensus in the ministry and to negotiating with China.
In the Japanese hierarchical society, inferiors are required to show respect to their
superiors. However, superiors have to be sensitive to the feelings of subordinates. The
top-down decision making system is alien to Japanese society. Shillony (1990) writes,
"The political tradition of Japan emphasizes the primacy of harmony and the importance
of consensual decision" (p. 121).
In the hierarchical society of Japan, the relationships between superiors and
subordinates are not dictatorial but reciprocal or one which is connected by the
psychological norm called on and giri. The Shogakukan Progressive Japanese-English
Dictionary (1993) defines on as "an obligation, moral indebtedness" (p.263). Johnson
(1991) defines it as "a sense of ongoing, undischargeable obligation within a relationship;
a concept of permanent indebtedness to another" (p.379). Benedict (1946) states: "The
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word for 'obligation' which covers a person's indebtedness from greatest to least is on" (p.
99).
The Shogakukan Progressive Japanese-English Dictionary defines giri as a "duty",
or "obligation" (p. 462). More precisely, "giri is one's obligation to repay on to one's
fellows" (Benedict, 1946, p. 134). Johnson (1991) definesgiri as "a deep sense of duty
or social obligation toward (an)other person(s), as dictated by a (sic.) relationship of
relative closeness or distance" (p. 376). Giri includes all the duties one owes not only to
one's family members but members of the group one belongs to.
It is the combination of on and giri which permeates all social relationships, and,
in particular, those between leaders and subordinates in groups in Japan. Benedict (1946)
asserts that this is the psychological process underlying the Japanese hierarchical society.
The norms of on and giri appeared during the feudal era (12th-16th century) of
Japanese history (Campbell & Noble, 1993). In feudal Japan, on refered to the debt a
warrior incurred in receiving land and protection from his lord. A worrior had a moral
obligation to return this favor. This was giri. Giri referred to a warrior's obligation to
serve his lord, even at the cost of his life.
The reciprocal norms on and giri are clearly manifested in Japanese gift-giving
customs (Befu, 1974). The heads of most households bring gifts twice a year to company
superiors or to persons who gave them assistance. In other words, a man brings gifts in
ceremonial fashion to the persons in thanks for the on. Therefore, giri is a moral
imperative to give gifts toward other members of a society.
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It is impossible to understand Japanese politics without considering these psycho
cultural traits -- on and giri. The former Director General of Environment Agency
Masahisa Aoki (1994), writes in his reminiscences that in the summer he usually receives
about 500 gifts and in the winter he receives about 600 gifts. Most of them are from
those he took care of in his constituencies. Furthermore, about 40 or 50 Diet persons
gave him gifts twice a year. This gift giving activity is a traditional Japanese custom to
express one's gratitude for others. Therefore, it is not a bribe.
Also important is the fact that Aoki sent cards of thanks to every person who gave
him gifts. By doing so, people thought he was a responsible and trustworthy person.
Aoki (1994) continues that when he and Diet person Kikuchi made a trip to Washington
in order to attend an international conference, Kikuchi sent more than 1000 greeting cards
to his supporters. This is an example of giri- based behavior because Diet persons have
a moral indebtedness or on to their supporters.
The values of on and giri are the fundamental and the most important principles
of the behavior of Japanese politicians. Benedict (1946) points out that "in the Cabinet
of Japan, people are 'forced with giri' and 'concerned with giri'" (p.140). Even today, on
and giri are the most important elements among the relationships of politicians in Japan
(Wakata, 1991).
Interviews with Diet persons will illustrate the importance of on and giri in the
behavior of Japanese politicians. In an interview that this writer had with former Minister
of Labor, Akira Ohno, he stated:
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I belonged to the Murakami faction at first because I had on to a faction
leader Murakami by asking him to be a middleman of my marriage. I
knew that the Murakami faction was so weak because there were not so
many members, but I decided to belong to it until Murakami died
(personal communication, December 24, 1994).
By belonging to the Murakami faction, Ohno tried to repay on to Murakami.
The politician who most recognized the value ofon and giri was former Prime
Minister Tanaka. In 1978, four Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) leaders were running for
the election of the party presidency. They were Takeo Hukuda, Masayoshi Ohira,
Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Toshio Komoto. Although most people including the press
predicted the triumph ofHukuda, Ohira won that election and became the prime minister.
Sato (1994) writes in her diary ofNovember 26th 1978 that because Ohira was a close
friend ofTanaka, Tanaka called many local assemblymen, mayors, and influential business
persons who had on to himself to ask them to help Ohira. Therefore, they worked very
hard in asking and persuading party members in each local area to vote for Ohira. This
is the reason why Ohira came from behind and finally won the election.
Diet person Yasuoki Urano also stresses the significance of on and giri in
Japanese politics. In an interview that this writer had with Urano, he said the following:
When I became a Diet person for the first time, the then Prime Minister
Takeshita told me 'Hello I son of Diet person Urano. I'm very sorry
because your father passed away so soon' [His father-in-law was a Diet
person.] I was deeply moved by Takeshita's remark because even though
that was the first time for me to see Prime Minister Takeshita, he knew
about me a lot. Thus, I felt on to Takeshita (personal communication,
December 26, 1994).
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It can be concluded that in a Japanese hierarchical society, leaders and
subordinates are united by the reciprocal norm on and giri. Because of these norms,
leaders can easily make a consensus and wield power, on the other hand, their followers
can ask leaders for various kinds of assistance. On and giri often regulate the behavior
of Japanese politicians.
The Work of Chie Nakane and the Organization of the LDP
The next book examined is Japanese Society written by Chie Nakane. She
analyzes the characteristics of Japanese social organizations that have survived the
process of modernization. Nakane (1970) argued that the entire social structure of Japan
is characterized by the existence of vertically organized groups.
Figure 1 shows that in a group, members are positioned hierarchically.

(a)

I\
/\/\
(b)-----(c)

(d)------(e)------(f)

Figure 1. Hierarchical Structure of a Japanese Group�
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Nakane points out many important characteristics of this hierarchical organization.
Among these, the following five comments are helpful in analyzing the cultural
background of Japanese politics.
First, the vertical relationship between two individuals is the basis of the structural
principle of Japanese society. In other words, a group can exist without a horizontal
relationship among the members. Furthermore, Nakane (1970) argued that the higher the
degree of the functioning of a vertical relationship, the stronger is the degree of the
functioning of the group. Therefore, if there is a group which does not have an obvious
vertical relationship, it is unstable and can hardly be successful and increase in size.
According to Nakane's model, hierarchical relationships between individuals can
be applied to the relationships between groups. Nakane (1970) stated that "it is almost
impossible to create a horizontal link between two or more independent groups" (p. 54).
The merger of two groups is possible if one group absorbs or dominates the other. The
merger of two groups is also possible if a satisfactory leader emerges from each. Nakane
maintains that this is very rare.
Second, the rank of each member is based on his/her "relative age, year of entry
into company or length of continuous service . . ." (Nakane, 1970, p. 25). This
characteristic is known as the seniority system. This seniority system is a system of
employment in which worker's rank and salary are based on the length of service in the
company.
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Since the 1970s, however, private enterprises have been forced to focus more on
their employees' talents and abilities. Japanese corporations started to suffer from huge
labor costs as they hired more workers, and since 1980s, this tendency has accelerated.
Third, the leader (a) is personally and directly related to members (b) and (c). On
the other hand, the relationship between (a) and (d), (e) and (f) are indirect. Therefore,
a group is most stable if it consists of two levels with all members linked directly to the
leader. Nakane (1970) stated that normally, one or two dozen members comprise the
ideal size of an effective core of a group. In a group of this size, members on the lowest
level stand very close to the leader. This statement implies that the effectiveness of a
group in Japan is based on a cohesive relationship between leaders and followers.
Fourth, the personal and emotional relationship between an upper and a lower
status individual is expressed by the Japanese term oyabun-kobun (boss-subordinate
relationships). Oya and ko refer to parent and child respectively. Literally, the oyabun
in Japanese society plays the role of the father.
The relationship between oyabun and kobun is closely related to the norm of on
and giri which was discussed above. Nakane (1970) states as follows:
The essential elements in the relationship are that the kobun receives
benefits or help from his oyabun, such as assistance in securing
employment or promotion.... The kobun, in tum, is ready to offer his
services whenever the oyabun requires them (pp. 42-43).
This is exactly the same as the reciprocal relationship between on and giri, which often
regulates the behavior of Japanese politicians. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction between
the oyabun and the kobun and on and giri in Japanese human relationships.
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Oyabun

giri

on
Kobun

Figure 2. The Relationship Between Oyabun and Kobun.
Fifth, the qualification of the leader in Japanese society does not depend on wealth
or intelligence but on his/her ability to understand and attract his followers. If a man
cannot capture his followers emotionally, he/she can not be a leader. This characteristic
is consistent with the Japanese decision making system which was explained above.
Consensus building is necessary in order to make decisions in Japanese organizations.
Thus, it is necessary for a leader to understand his/her followers in order to make the
consensus building process operate efficiently. Kyogoku (1987) describes the ideal leader
in Japanese society as follows:
Leaders are expected not to be cold-hearted, but rather warm persons,
kind, astute, and personable individuals who get rid of bureaucratic
formalism, and who establish a human relationship between themselves
and their subordinates (pp. 89-90).
Nakane's model on the Japanese hierarchical society 1s helpful to the
understanding ofLDP politics (Wakata, 1991). The most probable reason for this is LDP
factions are easily explained by the model. Factions in the LDP are more obvious, active,
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and durable than factions in other parties, and as such, the LDP has been called a coalition
of factions (see, Ishikawa, 1992; Sone and Kanazashi, 1989; W akata, 1991).
However, by December, 1994 all ofthe five LDP factions were dissolved officially
as a means ofrefonning the LDP. This action was based on the report submitted by the
LDP internal reform headquarters. Most of the LDP members recognized that LDP
factions became a hotbed for corruption and scandals that were alienating voters. Under
such circumstances the paper called for the dissolution ofthe factions and closure of their
offices (LDP, 1994).
In spite ofthese developments, it would be premature to consider this as the end
ofLDP factions. The LDP party headquarters allows bodies such as policy study groups
to remain (Habatsu, 1994). Currently, all five faction leaders have been contemplating
the maintenance of their groups as policy study groups, (Kakuha, 1994). On February
1, 1995, Michio Watanabe, who was a faction leader, held a meeting for policy study and
reported the impossibility of maintaining his faction. However, he wanted to keep the
unity ofmembers who belonged to the Watanabe faction (Jimintounai, 1995).
More time is needed to judge whether or not the factions are actually dissolved.
In any event, however, the study of factions is essential for the understanding of LDP
politics. In the following part, the behavior patters of LDP politicians both inside and
outside of factions will be analyzed according to Nakane's (1970) model.
The first characteristic is that the vertical relationship between two individuals is
the basis of the structural principle of Japanese society. Factions were formed by

30

gathering Diet persons around leading politicians (Iseri, 1988). The fact that all of the
factions were named after the names of the faction leaders indicates that factions had a
hierarchical structure with faction leaders serving as the head of a group.
The second characteristic is that the system of ranking is determined by seniority.
Thayer (1973) points out that positions in faction hierarchies were determined by
considering age and the number of times a Diet person had been elected. He considers
the most important criteria to be "length of time in faction and degree of service to the
faction" (p. 23). Former Director General of the Environmental Agency Masahisa Aoki
(1994) writes in his reminiscences that he had a handicap in being promoted because he
had to move from one faction to another one when a faction was dissolved because of a
faction leader's death. Generally, the length of time in a faction seems to be more
important than age in the hierarchical organization of factions.
The third characteristic is that the relationship between leader and followers has
to be personal and direct in order to maintain the stability of the group. Each faction has
its own office and has a regular meeting every week (Iseri, 1988). These offices exist for
faction members to exchange information and communicate with each other. This face
to-face communication contributes to the enhancement of morale within factions.
Conversely, the lack of communication between leaders and followers sometimes
results in critical situations for factions. In her entry for February 26, 1985, Sato (1994)
writes in her diary that she advised former prime minister Tanaka, then the faction leader,
to take more opportunities to talk with young members of his faction and suggested that
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he have lunch with them regularly. Sato noted that an internal cleavage within the Tanaka
faction was occurring because of the lack of communication between Tanaka and faction
members. At that time, the Tanaka faction had about 80 members, and about 40 members
or one half tried to form a new faction.
The fourth characteristic is that the relationship between the leader and followers
is a personal and emotional one which is called oyabun-kobun (boss-subordinate
relationship). Sone and Kanazashi (1989) pointed out that in factions, leaders are called
oyaji (father) by faction members, and members are recognized as kobun (children). The
relationship between faction leaders and members can be considered as oyabun-kobun.
In factions, the reciprocal norm on and giri does exist. On from leaders to
members includes the provision of money and ministerial posts or party executive posts.
Giri from members to leaders means to work for leaders in order to help their leaders to

become a party president. The details of factional politics will be discussed in Chapter V.
Oyabun-kobunis apparently manifested in the relationship between Tanaka and
the members in his faction. Oyabun-kobun is a boss-subordinate relationship which can
be interpreted as father-child relationship. Therefore, even though a leader may have to
resign from an official post or may have to leave the party, he can still retain power and
have influence on the decision making process both within the LDP and the government
(Yamamoto, 1989). Tanaka's arrest on July 27, 1976 because of his role in what came
to be known as the Lockheed Scandal, did not elimenate his position as a faction leader
and power broker. In other words, Tanaka's influence in the Japanese political system,
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and especially within the LDP, however, was not broken by this otherwise embarrassing
event. Even though he had officially resigned from the LDP, Tanaka was instrumental
in assisting Masayoshi Ohira, Zenko Suzuki, and Yasuhiro Nakasone to serve as prime
ministers in subsequent Japanese governments (Uchida, 1987).
The fifth characte1istic is that the qualification of a leader in Japanese society
depends on his/her ability to understand and attract followers. Nakane (1970) minimizes
the importance of wealth and intelligence as a qualification for a leader. However, as far
as factions are concerned, all of these qualifications are required for being a leader.
Kitaoka (1985) pointed out four conditions for becoming a faction leader. These are: (1)
the ability to collect money; (2) popularity to attract followers; (3) experience and ability
to deal with international and foreign affairs; (4) experience and ability to manage the
party.
Iseri (1988) emphasized the following three qualifications for faction leaders.
First, the number of times being elected as a Diet person is important: at least 10 times
is essential to be a faction leader. Second, it is necessary for faction leaders to take care
of faction members by giving them government posts and party executive posts. Third,
faction leaders have to provide money to members especially when elections are held.
It is concluded that faction leaders have to satisfy the needs of their followers
mentally and physically. A more detailed explanation is necessary to analyze the roles of
the faction leaders. These will be discussed in Chapter V. However, it follows from what
has been said that the psycho-cultural norm on and giri (On is man's indebtedness and gi,i
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is man's obligation to repay

on.)

make the relationship between faction leaders and

followers coherent and stable.
Factions have to satisfy the psychological needs of their members. Otherwise the
needs of about 400 LDP Diet members could not be fulfilled (see, Rothacher, 1993;
Thayer, 1973 ). Thus, undoubtedly, the existence of LOP factions, which were more
active and durable than those in any other parties, played a significant role for the stability
ofLDP administration. Moreover, the fact that Nakane's (1970) model is well-applicable
to LDP factions gives the factions 'cultural legitimacy' because the factions were in
harmony with traditional Japanese organizational and cultural traits.
Outside the factions, a hierarchical relationship among LDP politicians also exists.
It can be seen in the relationship between Diet persons and local politicians or koenkai
(personal support groups), which will be discussed in Chapter V. Wakata (1991) stated
that in local areas in Japan, the existence of hierarchical human networks of politicians
with Diet persons as heads can be commonly observed. Most of the LDP politicians
belong to those networks. Former Director General of the Environment Agency Aoki
(1994) who was a Diet person for 25 years writes that some local politicians joined his
hierarchical network. "Now, five assemblymen at prefecture belong to my network and
these members have not changed yet" (Aoki, p. 180, 1994).
The relationship between Diet persons and local politicians are also connected by
the reciprocal norm on and giri. Diet persons provide assistance to local politicians by
making speeches and giving money when there are elections (on). In an interview that
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this writer had with Diet person Takashi Kawamura, a LDP renegade, he stated that "I
am supporting three municipal assemblymen, that is, they could be elected with my
assistance. They are totally dependent on me. This is very rare in the Shinseito (new
party's name)" (personal communication, December 19, 1994).
Another type of assistance from the Diet person to local politicians is for him/her
to accept their wish, which is identical with the wish of koenkai members, to receive
government funding for local projects. If the wish is beyond the ability of the Diet person
to grant, he/she must ask his/her fellow Diet person or a faction leader for assistance.
Local politicians have to repay these on (repaying on is gi,ri). If there is a general
election, not only the koenkai members who support a Diet person but also the koenkai
members who support local politicians work for the campaign of a Diet person because
they received on from the politicians. Anthropologist Theodore Bestor conducted a
fieldstudy in Tokyo and described the behavior of assemblyman Tsurumi during the
election. Bestor (1989) stated that whenever an election approached, Tsurumi mobilized
many of his koenkai members to provide volunteer workers for the campaign of the same
party's Diet person. Those koenkai members solicited votes from their personal networks
including family, relatives, and colleagues.
It is important to note that the koenkai is a key factor in the relationship between
Diet persons and local politicians. It is the koenkai members who work for politicians,
and it is also the koenkai members who ask the help of the politicians in getting subsidies
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for local projects. Currently, regardless of the party they belong to, most Diet persons
have personal support organizations even if they are not called koenkai.
Originally, however, koenkai were organized by LDP politicians.

More

importantly, koenkai for LDP politicians are more active than those for the politicians of
any other party (Shindo, 1994). In election campaigns, LDP candidates rely mainly on
koenkai not only by asking supporters to vote for them, but also by asking supporters to
assist them financially. On the other hand, the candidates of the Social Democratic Party
of Japan (SDPJ) can count on organized labor unions, and the candidates of the Japan
Communist Party (JCP) have a "highly mobilized party organization" (Shindo, p. 173,
1994).
On both the inside and the outside of the factions, LDP politicians are organized
hierarchically. There is a coherent and vertical relationship among LDP Diet persons,
local politicians and their support members. In Japanese society and hence in politics, the
higher the degree ofthe functioning ofthe vertical relationship, the stronger is the degree
of the functioning of a group.
The Work ofTakeo Doi and Relationships Among Japanese Parties
The last book examined is the Anatomy of Dependence written by Takeo Doi, a
Japanese psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. After being translated in English in 1973, this
book has made a significant contribution to the cultural and psychological study on Japan
in both Asian and Western countries. However, only a few political scientists have
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applied Doi's work to the analysis of Japanese politics. Douglas Mitchell (1976) and
Kyoji Wakata (1991) are examples of them In this section, Doi's work will be explained,
and it will be applied to analyze the relationships among the LDP and the opposition
parties under LDP rule for 38 years. This analysis is significant to the understanding how
the LDP maintained the stability of its administration until 1993 because few political
scientists have analyzed this through an application of Doi's work. Only Mitchell (1976)
analyzed the case of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Crisis in 1960 by applying Doi's
work.

However, one case study is not enough to describe general traits of the

relationships among the LDP and the opposition parties. The fundamental principle that
existed in the relationship among them will be discussed in the following part.
The terrnamae (pronounced "ah-my-eh") which expresses the fundamental human
need to be dependent is the key in Doi's (1973) work. Doi states that amae is a key
concept for understanding the personality structure of the Japanese. The term amae is
difficult for non-Japanese to understand. While it is a commonly understood expression
in Japanese, amae has no exact counterpart in the English language. Amae is a noun
derived from the verb amaeru. A Japanese-English dictionary lists the vernacular
equivalents of "behave like a baby (spoiled child), depend on others; kindness" (Kondo
and Takano, 1994, p. 51). Doi himself suggests the word "wheedle" as an English word
for manifesting the desire to amaeru.
A mae may be an universal human need expressing the wish for dependency.
However, in Western culture, adult dependency is considered to be a sign of immaturity.
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Apparently, the values which are expressed in the words "independence and autonomy"
have been idealized in Western culture. Conversely, Doi (1973) points out that although
dependency is a psychological motive expressed during infancy and childhood, this
behavior pattern is maintained throughout one's life span and is even institutionalized into
the social structure of Japan.
If true, this statement illustrates the fact that amae is a very useful concept which
can explain behavior patterns of the Japanese and the characteristics of Japanese society.
Frank Johnson (1993) examines the concept of amae: "(1) as an individual, organic trait;
(2) as an interactional phenomenon occurring between two persons; (3) as a relationship
of an individual with groups and family; (4) as a series of relationships between large
groups themselves" (p. 156). In the following part, the relationships between large
groups will be examined, that is, the relationships among the LOP and the opposition
parties will be discussed. It will be shown how opposition party members incorporated
the values of amae into their seemingly aggressive attitude against the LOP. It will also
be shown how the LOP could maintain a stable relationship with opposition parties.
In order to understand the behavior of opposition party members in the Diet, it is
necessary to look at the legislative process and to look at how the LOP effectively
controlled it. Baerwald (1986) lists the following eleven steps which have to be taken
before a legislative bill is introduced into the Diet,
1.

Government officials within a Ministry prepare a draft.

2.

The draft is circulated within the Ministry for general approval.
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3.

Discussions begin to take place between the Ministry's officials and the

relevant division in the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC).
4.

Within the government, the draft of the new legislation is discussed at one

or several meetings of the Council of Vice Ministers to ensure that the prerogatives of all
ministries or agencies have been considered.
5.

Within the governing party, the draft legislation receives consideration by

the full Policy Research Council.
6.

Within the government, the bill is considered by a meeting of the Cabinet.

7.

Within the governing party, the bill is discussed by the executive council

in order to determine its place on the party's legislative agenda for that particular session
of the Diet.
8.

More or less simultaneously (within the governing party) discussions begin

between the party leadership and its Diet Strategy Committee, generally that of the House
of Representatives first.
9.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties may be informed, either directly by

Ministry officials, or through the media, that the Cabinet is likely to introduce this
particular bill to this session of the Diet.
10.

The opposition parties discuss the stance that they will take.

11.

In turn, the opposition parties' positions will be communicated by their

"Diet Strategy Committee (Kokutai)" members to the House Management Committee,
whose members determine whether the bill may or may not be controversial (p. 117).
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After these procedures, the standing committee of the Diet starts to process the
legislative bill by holding public hearings. It should be noted that before the bill is brought
to the committee, a consensus among the LDP and the opposition parties needs to be
reached. At the 11th step in this long consensus reaching procedure, the kokutai (Diet
Strategy Committee) plays a significant role in assisting the LDP and the opposition
parties to have "mutual consultations". The Kokutai, an informal organization, was not
affiliated to the Diet, but to each party.
Obi (1990) points out that members in kokutai often decide whether or not to pass
the bill. In order to pass the bill, the opposition parties were often given money by the
LDP. In an interview that this writer bad with the former Minister of Labor, Akira Ohno,
the former minister said:
Under the LDP administration, the LDP gave money to the opposition
parties for the purpose of formulating and influencing Diet strategy. I
know many examples, but I cannot tell you more about this (personal
communication, December 14, 1994).
Financial assistance from the LDP to the opposition parties was routine. The then
secretary to former Prime Minister Tanaka, Shigezou Hayasaka (1994) wrote:
Tanaka told me several times to bring money packed in a paper bag to the
opposition Diet person. When I asked him to stop giving money to them
[opposition party members], he said 'Calm down. He [opposition Diet
person] called me as many as five times in the midnight to ask me to assist
him. He was in trouble for lack of money. All I can do for him is to give
him money. Go to his office quickly'. (pp. 115-116).
This was an instance in which an opposition Diet person asked assistance from the LDP
Diet person personally.
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In the Japanese Diet, the bill can be passed by a majority of votes. Moreover,
according to the Diet Law, members of Standing Committees and Special Committees
shall be allocated to various parties in proportion to their numerical strength. (Article 46)
Therefore, while the LDP obtained a majority of the seats in the Diet, the LDP had an
absolute prevalence in committee balloting as well as in the plenary Diet session.
It is evident that the fewer the seats the LDP obtains, the more confrontation there
is among the LDP and the opposition parties. However, it is the reverse that actually
occurred. Although the LDP had been reduced to 49% of the seats in the Lower House
from an overwhelming majority since the 1970s, the opposition parties' obstructionist
tactics disappeared. (Krauss, 1984)
Ever since 1955 when the LDP was organized, a mutually dependent relationship
among the LDP and the opposition parties existed. When the LDP tried to force a bill
through the Lower House, the LDP Diet persons who belong to the kokutai (Diet
Strategy Committee) gave money to the opposition parties. Furthermore, the kokutai
members in the LDP sometimes organized the entire election campaign of socialist
candidates. (Department of politics in Asahi Newspaper, 1992) These strategies were
employed when the Tanaka faction of the LDP became dominant in the 1970s.
As the mutual dependency deepened, the conflict among the LDP and the
opposition parties disappeared. This was undoubtedly a manifestation of amae. Amae
is a deep-seated desire for dependent and interdependent relationships. Johnson ( 1993)
states "perhaps amae does represent a sociobiological drive for strong, dependent
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affiliation and indulgence, ..." (p.200). As has been discussed, Amae is viewed more
positively in Japan than in the Western countries.
In conclusion, the oposition parties became dependent on the LDP through the
application of amae. Opposion parties cooporated with the LDP in passing legislation
proposed by the dominant party, and in return the opposion parties were given financial
payoffs by the LDP factions. This mutually beneficial relationship enhanced the power
of the LDP and reinforced the amae-based set of relationships that were so expressive of
deep-seated Japanese psychological desires.
Conclusion
Important national characteristics of the Japanese people were discussed in this
chapter. Behaviors of LDP politicians were based on these characteristics. It became
clear that the organization of the LDP and behaviors of LDP politicians were in harmony
with Japanese culture. Direct personal relationships are the basis of the hierarchically
organized relationships among LDP politicians and among LDP politicians and their
supporters. In these relationships, the traditional norms on and giri often regulate the
behaviors of the politicians.
A mae was another useful concept in the analysis of Japanese politics. Mutual

dependent relationships among the LDP politicians and the politicians of opposion parties
could be analyzed by applying this concept. The next chapter will describe how the amae-
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based psychological characterisitcs of LDP politicans influence the decision making
process of the LDP.

CHAPTER III
LDP DIET PERSONS AND DECISION MAKING
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE LDP
Introduction
In this chapter, characteristics of LDP Diet persons and decision making
organizations will be examined. This examination is essential for the understanding of
LDP politics. More specifically, it will be determined that the decision making processes
of the LDP are largely influenced by the Japanese cultural emphasis on harmony.
Harmony has been one of the most important values for the Japanese. Article One
of the Seventeen-Article Constitution, promulgated by Prince Shotoku in 604 a.d., says
that harmony is the most significant Japanese value. In the 20th century, this value
continues to influence the behavior of the Japanese. Lebra (1986), in a study analyzing
the psychological characteritics of the Japanese people, found that the Japanese are
sensitive to the feelings of one another, and "find smooth, harmonious, co-operative
human interaction most indispensable for achieving a goal" (p. 57).
Japanese culture, which emphasizes harmony, originated in the deep-seated
psychological characteristic amae (mutual dependency). Amae was explained in the
previous chapter. Lebra & Lebra (1986) argue that, because of the existence of mutual
dependency in Japanese culture, the Japanese have higher affiliative proclivities. Moeran
43
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(1986) argues that the Japanese people provide each other with extensive emotional
support. He says, "Members ofa group are expected to conform and co-operate with one
another, to avoid open conflict and competition. The emphasis, therefore, is on harmony,
and behavior tends to be ritualized," (p. 64).
LDP Diet Persons
First ofall, the characteristics ofthe occupational background ofthe LDP Diet
persons will be examined. Former bureaucrats (especially, high-ranking public servants)
and former local politicians have been numerically the most important. Fukui (1970)
states, "The top-ranking public servants and prefectural assembly members, together
accounting for about less than 1% ofthe working population ofthe country, provide just
about a halfofit" (pp. 61-62).
These characteristics have not as yet changed. As of 1995, slightly over 25% of
the LDP members of the lower house were identified as former local politicians, and
slightly over 30% ofthe LDP members ofthe upper house were identified as former local
politicians. As for former local politicians, they also exist in great numbers in the Social
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). As of1994, approximately 30% ofSocialist Diet
persons in the lower house were identified as former local politicians, and approximately
20% ofthe socialist Diet persons in the upper house have been identified as former local
politicians.
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Compared with the other parties, the LDP has a much greater percentage of
former high-ranking bureaucrats among its members. As of 1995, approximately 17% of
the LDP members of the lower house and 20% of the LDP members of the upper house
are identified as former high-ranking bureaucrats. On the other hand, there are no
Socialist Diet persons who were former bureaucrats in the lower house, and there are only
two socialist Diet persons who were high-ranking bureaucrats in the upper house.
A high-ranking bureaucrat in this thesis means a "career" civil servant who is on
the elite track involving higher pay and greater opportunities for promotion. There are
also the "noncareer" civil servants. They become bureaucrats by taking different kinds
of examinations. For most of the "noncareer" civil servants, the position of assistant
section chief is the highest position they can attain before they retire (Koh, 1989).
The fact that there are a significant number ofLDP Diet persons who were former
top-ranking bureaucrats reveals another oftheir characteristics: the academic background
ofthe LDP Diet persons is biased. As ofl995, over one fifth of the LDP members of the
lower house were graduates of the University of Tokyo. The University of Tokyo is the
most prestigious university in Japan. This university produces the largest number of top
ranking bureaucrats in the country.

In the examination which is used to identify

prospective elite bureaucrats, approximately one third of the successful candidates in
1994 were graduates of the University of Tokyo (Ohmiya, 1994).
There are three reasons why there are so many former bureaucrats in the LDP.
First, the LDP has recruited top-ranking bureaucrats because their expertise is useful for
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the LOP. Unlike American civil servants, Japanese bureaucrats work in the same
department until they retire. More importantly, the Japanese bureaucracy dominates
every kind of information and technology concerning policy making (Kitagawa, 1993).
Civil servants can acquire enough expertise which is relevant to legislating functions not
only through training within departments but also through communications with
politicians. Thus, the ability of the bureaucrats to formulate policy is useful for the LOP.
In reality, LOP Diet persons who were former top-ranking bureaucrats are highly rated
in the party. Sato & Matsuzaki (1986) write that Diet persons who were former elite
bureaucrats are promoted faster than other Diet persons. They point out that on the
average the former become ministers one term earlier than the latter.
Second, former bureaucrats come from affluent families which traditionally are
conservative in their political affiliation. Their conservative affiliation leads them toward
the LOP. Koh (1989) states that University of Tokyo students have grown up in
relatively affluent families. Over one half of the University of Tokyo students attended
private supplementary schools or preparatory schools and were taught by private tutors
(Koh, 1989). Furthermore, the list of the top ten high schools that produced successful
applicants to the University of Tokyo Law Department is led by eight private high schools
and two schools attached to national universities (Ohmiya, 1994). These ten schools are
far more expensive than public high school.
Koh (1989) argues that the affluence of the families of the students is related to
the political orientation of the students. He points out that about 41% of the freshmen
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at the University of Tokyo in 1983 considered themselves conservative or somewhat
conservative, whereas about 34% of the general public considered themselves as
conservative or somewhat conservative. According to this study, family affluence of
University of Tokyo students affects their political orientation. Affluent families tend to
be conservative in political orientation. As a result, elite civil servants tend to become
members of the LDP rather than the SDPJ.
Third, former top-ranking bureaucrats became LDP Diet persons because the LDP
Diet persons are able to make decisions from a broader perspective than bureaucrats. In
an interview with this author, a LDP renegade, Diet person Iwao Matsuda, said:
I was a civil servant. [He was a director of a division in the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) before becoming a LDP Diet
person.] I wanted to work for public interests, but I felt a limitation of
my power as a bureaucrat. . . . I experienced the negative side of
sectionalism frequently. In the past, there were no problems. However,
there are many issues which have to be decided by politicians (from a
broad perspective). . . . Bureaucrats can not make decisions without
ignoring the framework of other ministries (Personal communication,
December 1 7, 1994).
He became a LDP Diet person not because he was conservative, but because he
was an concerned person who wanted to work for the public interest. As long as a one
party system dominated by the LDP existed for 38 years, becoming a LDP Diet person
was the only way for bureaucrats to get involved in the government decision making
process.
Another characteristic of the LDP Diet person is that many of them are second
generation Diet persons. About 45% of the LDP Diet persons have fathers, fathers-in-
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law, grandfathers, or elder brothers who were also Diet persons (Ohmiya, 1994, and
Uchida, 1989). On the other hand, only 10% of the Socialist Diet person are second
generation (Ohmiya, 1994). Among the second generation LDP Diet persons, 9 Diet
persons are third generation, and one LDP Diet person and three LDP renegades are
fourth generation.
The number of second generation Diet persons started to increase in the 1970s
(Kitaoka, 1990). In 1960, only 10% of LDP Diet persons were second generation
(Kitaoka, 1990). The increase in the number of second generation Diet persons has
accelerated. As of 1995, all of the four top party executives of the LDP, the party
president, the secretary general, the chairman of the PARC, and the chairman of the
executive council, are second generation.
Interviews of second generation Diet persons will clarify the reasons why they
became Diet persons. The first person to be examined is Akira Ohno. Although Ohno
was not reelected as a Diet person in 1993, he served nine terms as a member of the lower
house and also served as the Minister of Labor and Minister of Transport. His father,
Banboku Ohno, was one of the most influential faction leaders and power brokers in the
history of the LDP. In an interview with this author, Ohno stated his reason for wanting
to become a Diet person:
As you know, my father was a politician. Before I entered the university,
my father told me, "Study political science and become a politician." At
that time, I was not interested in politics at all. However, my elder
brother had already been studying economics in order to be a
businessman. So, I was the only son who could follow in my father's
footsteps. There were no particular reasons to become a politician, but
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I wanted to improve this country and society (Personal communication,
December 24, 1994).
Judging by this interview, Ohno became a politician because his father persuaded him to
be one.
The second person to be examined is Kabun Mutou. He is currently chairman of
the executive council. (As mentioned, this is one of the four top leadership positions.) He
also served as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Minister of MITI, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both his father and his grandfather were LDP Diet persons
who served as members of the lower house.
In an interview with this author, Mutou said:
In the beginning of the 1960s, I was selected as a member of a delegation
of young people dispatched to foreign countries. During a 75 day tour in
other countries, I came to realize that Japan was developing only
economically, and its politics and diplomacy were far behind those of
other developed countries. Immediately after this trip, there was a lower
house special election. At that time, I decided to become a politician
(Personal communication, December 18, 1994).
Unlike Akira Ohno, Mutou did not mention either his father and his grandfather.
However, he probably did not become a Diet person through his own effort alone. In the
interview, Mutou also said that, because he was on good terms with Yasuhiro Nakasone
before becoming a politician, he became his follower. Therefore, he had a relatively close
relationship with LDP politicians before becoming a politician himself. It is reasonable
to conclude that his father, being a politician, gave Mutou opportunities to make
acquaintances with LDP politicians and they influenced him to become a LDP Diet
person.
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The third person to be examined is Yasuoki Urano. He is currently chairman of
welfare committee in the lower house, and has served six terms as a Diet person. His
father-in-law was a LDP Diet person who served as Minister of Labor.
At this point, it is necessary to explain the concept of adoption in Japan.
Traditionally, the household (ie) was the basic social unit in Japanese society. Therefore,
the continuation of the house was extremely important. Under the Meiji Constitution
(pre-World War II constitution), only a son can be an heir of the household. This
regulation does not exist in the current constitution. Nevertheless, if there is no son in a
family, the adoption of a son-in-law by his in-laws has been a common practice. If
adopted, the husband takes his wife's surname and he becomes an equal heir in his wife's
family (Campbell & Noble, 1993). In Diet person Drano's case, he was adopted into his
wife's family because her family did not have any sons.
In an interview with this author, he explained why he became a Diet person:
As my father and father-in-law were close friends, I married my wife with
the condition that I never became a politician. However, in 1976, my
father-in-law died suddenly. So, [supporters of my father-in-law] thought
one of my new family members should become a successor to my father
in-law, and they enthusiastically pushed me to become a politician. I did
not want to be a politician, but finally, I could not help agreeing to
become a politician (Personal communication, December 28, 1994).
Under these circumstances, Diet person Urano could not ignore his traditional
moral obligation. It can be concluded that he became a politician to meet the expectation
of supporters of his father-in-law. Considering this case from the point of view of the
supporters of a politician, they want to support someone who represents their interests.
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Yasuoki Drano was probably the person most likely to be elected because he was viewed
as being in a position to best represent the interests of koenkai (personal support groups).
The last person to be examined is Seiko Noda. As mentioned, she is a freshman
Diet person. Her grandfather served in the lower house for nine terms and also served
as Minister of Construction.
In an interview with this author, she explained her motivation in becoming a Diet
person:
I wanted to be a politician when I was a small child. Fortunately, I had
many supporters who educated me politically in Gifu. [This is a city
where her grandfather's constituency existed. It was not until she became
a local assembly person in Gifu that she started to live in Gifu.]
Furthermore, I noticed that there were neither very many young Diet
persons in the LDP, nor were there very many female Diet persons. So,
I wanted to positively impact the LDP (Personal communication,
December 26, 1994).
Apparently, she became a politician with the assistance of her grandfather's
constituency. She did not mention her grandfather's name in this interview. However,
supporters of her grandfather were essential because she resigned from a hotel job when
she was in her late twenties in order to run for election in an unfamiliar city.
In addition to their own motivation to be a politician, the expectation of the
constituency is a key factor in a emergence of the second generation Diet person. Uchida
(1989) says that the increase in the number of second generation Diet persons can be
acounted for by two reasons. First, In the 1970s, the first generation Diet persons started
to retire.

Second, when older leaders retire, their supporters try to maintain the

organizational strength of koenkai. As a result, they believe it preferable to support the
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son of a retired Diet person. If a son does not become a politician, koenkai dissolves and
supporters must find another candidate to represent their interests and give him/her their
support. Therefore it is much easier for koenkai members to have a son of retired Diet
person whom they have supported become their political representative. The koenkai
members have invested considerable time and energy in building relationship of mutual
understanding with the Diet person as well as with each other, and they believe it best that
their relationship be sustained and deepened.
The Decision Making Organizations I
Until 1994, the decision making organs of the LDP were officially three in
number: the party conference, the assembly of the members of both houses of the Diet,
and the executive council. In 1995, by revising the Party Law, the party officials' council
(yakuinkai) was added to formal decision making organs (Party Law, Art. 22). This
organ will be explained later, however, the function of this organ is not very clear
because it has not played a significant role in actual policy making cases since August
1995. Therefore, the functions of the original three organs will be discussed here.
The first official decision making organ is the party conference. According to the
Party Law, the party conference is "the supreme organ of the party" (Party Law, Art. 24).
The party conference consists of the LDP Diet persons and four representatives selected
in each prefectural branches (Party Law, Art. 24). This conference is convened once a
year (usually in January) by the president of the LDP (Party Law, Art. 25). In addition,
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this conference can be held either if the assembly of the members of both houses of the
Diet request it or if more than one third of the prefectural branches of the LDP request
it (Party Law, Art. 25).
At the party conference, several routine activities are carried out. Those include:
greetings from the party president and guests; addresses discussing policy for the coming
year; asking for approval of the party's budget by the party leaders; and announcing names
of the people who have contributed to the party (Thayer, 1973). At the party conference
which was held in 1995, party leaders announced new policies, made new declarations,
revised the Party Law, and revealed a new party logo (Jimintoutaikai, 1995).
The Party Law also stipulated until 1994 that the president of the party be elected
by ballot at the party conference. The revised Party Law, however, simply stipulates that
the president be elected (Party Law, Art. 6). The most probable reason for the elimination
of the requirement that the election be held at the party conference was that in the history
of the LDP, only about half of the presidents of the LDP were elected by ballot at the
party conference.
Ideally, at the party conference, Diet persons and regional delegates should ask
questions directly to party leaders about party policies, and through this procedure,
influence the policy making process of the LDP. In reality, however, no serious debate
exists at the party conference. In an interview with this author, Diet person Seiko Noda
said, "The party conference is a ceremony which is held once a year" (Personal
communication, December 26, 1994).
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At the party conference in 1995, Diet person Noda, who was the youngest female
LDP Diet person, was the mistress of ceremonies at the conference. The atmosphere of
the party conference in 1995 was entertaining and included a performance by some cheer
leaders (Jimintoutaikai, 1995) In addition, Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama
attended this conference. All things considered, the party conference is not a place for
LDP members to engage in serious discussion of the political issues of the day.
In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Urano said, "Before the
party conference is held, all of the decisions concerning the issues presented at the
conference have already been made" (Personal communication, December 28, 1994). He
explained that any objections to party policies must have been expressed previously.
Two other reasons can account for the ceremonious evolution of the party
conference. First, it is difficult for Diet persons and regional delegates to get together
quickly. There were 295 LDP Diet persons as of 1995 and 188 delegates from 47
prefectures. A party conference can be held with a quorum of more than half of the
members (Party Law, Art. 27). Thus, attendance of at least 242 people is necessary to
open this conference.
A group like this is too large to discuss the issues extensively and to reach
immediate conclusions. At the assembly of the members of both houses of the Diet held
in July 1993, Secretary General Seiroku Kajiyama said, "It is necessary to elect a party
president before the Diet session finishes, ... but regrettably, we do not have time to
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have the party conference" (The department of politics of the Asahi Newspaper, 1993,
p. 234).
Second, regional politicians can not express their own opinions at the party
conference because most of them are in inferior positions to Diet persons. As discussed
in the previous chapter, vertical human relationships characterize the relationships among
LDP Diet persons, local politicians, and their supporters. It is impossible for local
politicians to express ideas which are against the opinions of their superiors. Boss
subordinate relationships limit the individual activities of the politicians.
The second formal decision making organ of the LDP is the assembly of the
members of both houses of the Diet. According to the Party Law, there are two functions
of the assembly. The first one is "to examine and decide especially important questions
concerning party management and activities in the Diet" (Party Law, Art. 30). The
second one is "to substitute for the party conference in matters requiring an urgent
decision" (Party Law, Art. 30).
The functions of this assembly are also ceremonious. When this author asked Diet
person Seiko Noda how many assemblies were held in 1994, she could not answer this·
question. She asked her secretary and then answered, "There were probably three
assemblies" (Personal communication, December 26, 1994). Moreover, she could
remember the topics of only two of the assemblies. This is an indication of the
unimportant, ceremonious nature of assembly meetings.
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The assembly which was held in July 1993, however, was an exceptional one.
There were heated debates among the Diet persons, and there was a lot of public criticism
directed against party leaders, indeed in front of TV cameras. At that time, the LDP was
divided and fractured by the controversial nature of the political reform bill. Although
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and his followers tried to pass that bill, many Diet
persons were opposed to it. Under these circumstances, the secretary general stated that
the new president would be selected not by a ballot, but through a discussion in an ad hoc
committee consisting of senior Diet persons. As a result, the reformers, especially young
Diet persons, became angry and heavily criticized the management and decision making
process of the LDP.
In the prevailing discussions, some Diet persons noted that decisions of the LDP
were often made informally, without open discussions in the assembly (The department
of politics of Asahi Newspaper, 1993). The exact same situation occurred in the 1960s.
Thayer (1973) said, "In short, what constitutes a matter important enough to be brought
before the assembly is decided by the party leadership" (p. 251).
By revising the Party Law in 1995, one rule was added that stipulated that an
assembly must be held at the request of at least one third of the Diet persons. This was
an attempt to hold assembly more frequently and encourage substantial deliberations in
the assemblies.
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The Decision Making Organization II (Executive Council)
The third official decision making organ of the LDP is the executive council.
There are 30 members in the executive council (Party Law, Art. 36). Fifteen members
are selected by ballot by the members of the House of Representatives. Seven members
are selected by ballot by the members of the House of Councilors. Eight members are
appointed by the president of the patty (Party Law, Art. 36).
As can be seen in Figure 3, the chairman of the executive council is one of the
three top officials in the patty. The secretary general and the chairman of the Policy
Affairs Research Council (PARC) are the other top posts. A faction leader or a person
in the second position in a faction usually becomes a chairman of the executive council
(ltagaki, 1993). Although the Party Law stipulates that a chairman is selected by the
members of the executive council, most of the chairmen are selected by the president of
the party.

President

I

The chainnan of
the executive council

The secretary general

Figure 3. Top Executives of the LDP.

The chaiman
of the PARC
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This reveals an important aspect of the decision making process of the LOP. As
previously mentioned, the maintenance of harmony within the group is one of the most
important mores of Japanese society. Thayer (1973) said
Japanese decisions are reached by hanashiai, which literally means talking
together. The ideal solution is to reach a unanimous decision, and the
Japanese politician will spend many hours trying to reach a compromise
that will satisfy all the interests concerned (p. 251).
In order to reach an unanimous decision, official decision making organs often
leave the decision making power to the informal meetings of top executives of the party
or the party president. Once a decision is made within those informal meetings or by an
individua� every Diet person is expected to obey that decision. By giving up the power
to make a decision, the Diet person expresses tacit approval for the decision made by the
top executives.
In September 1994, the executive council left its power to elect the chairman of
the executive council to the party president (Jiminsanyaku, 1994). In this case, there were
factional conflicts concerning who should be selected as the chairman. Therefore, party
President Kono chose the chairman by consulting other party leaders.
Article 35 of the Party Law stipulates that "the executive council examine and
decide important matters concerning party management and activities in the Diet". Also,
article 46 requires that the executive council give its consent to the decisions made by the
PARC before they become official party policy. Judging by these articles, the executive
council is a powerful organ in the sense that the approval of the executive council is
necessary to introduce a bill into the Diet.

I
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However, the executive council could not always wield the power prescribed for
it in the Party Law. In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Urano stated:
There are heated discussions in the executive council only when members
deal with politically controversial issues. For example, when we discussed
the bill to relieve victims of Atomic bomb (last year), we had very serious
discussions whether or not the responsibility of the government should be
added to the Articles of the Law for Relief A-bomb Victims (Personal
communication, December 28, 1994).
While it is evident that serious discussions sometimes occur in the executive
council, most of these discussions are ceremonious. Sato & Matsuzaki (1986) state that
the executive council always approves the decisions made by the PARC. One party
official said "The executive council is an organ to give satisfaction to the Diet persons
who want to express their own opinions" (Murayama, 1994).
The executive council held in 1977 was a typical example of this. In 1977, the
opening of the orange market was the most important and controversial issue pending
between Japan and the United States. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries, Ichiro Nakagawa, and his followers tried to persuade Diet persons who were
supported by orange farmers to agree to open the orange market. Under these
circumstances, Diet persons supporting the opening of the orange market planned to force
opponents to express their objections in the executive council. By forcing them to
express their objections freely, Diet persons who supported the opening of the market
expected their opponents to give up their decision making power. After many strong
objections to opening the orange market were expressed, every member agreed to leave
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his/her decision making power to the party leaders in the executive council (Kusano,
1991 ).
There is another example which indicates that the executive council is merely
ceremonial. In the executive council meeting held in December 1994, members discussed
the kind of words that should be used to express LDP policy concerning the revision of
the Japanese Constitution. The LDP were divided into two groups: Diet persons who
supported the current constitution and those who insisted on revising it. At the end of the
meeting, the secretary general, Yoshiro Mori, said, "I understand you have various kinds
of opinions. All opinions are reported to the party leaders. Lastly, I'd like to ask all of
you to leave your decision making power to the Three Leaders' meeting" (Jiminsoumukai,
1994). Obviously, the discussion of this meeting was held to enable the LDP Diet persons
to express their opinions. That was the procedure used to reach a unanimous agreement.
No decisions were made by ballot or majority rule in the executive council (Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, 1994). The meetings of the executive council are often held again and again
until members reach a unanimous agreement. If they can not reach consensus, there are
two ways to come to a unanimous decision. As mentioned, one of them is to leave the
power of decision making to the party executives. Another way is that opponents against
the majority absent themselves from the meeting (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1994).
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between the decision making process
of the LDP and democratic centralism On the surface, both of them are similar because
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decisions are made unanimously in each case. However, the major difference between
them is based on the position of leaders who often make a final decision.
In democratic centralism, the position of the leaders is unchallengable. "The
position of the top party leadership is sacrosanct; it can not be subjected to challenge or
criticism" (Fainsod, 1965). On the other hand, as is discussed in this chapter, top leaders
of the LDP can wield power only when they are supported by a majority of the Diet
persons. Leaders of the LDP always express their opinions freely and criticize the party
executives openly. An LDP president who loses the support of the majority is replaced
by another leader. Therefore, the decisions made by the leaders are the result of a long
procedure of negotiation and consultation among Diet persons who represent various
opinions.
There is no provision in the Party Law that decisions in the executive council must
be made by unanimous agreement. However, this has been a customary practice since the
LDP was formed. LDP Diet persons feel that this is an ideal way of making decisions
(Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). The decision making process of the LDP conforms to
traditional Japanese culture which respects harmony or order in a group.
The members of the executive council have customarily been senior Diet persons.
Until recently, Diet persons who served as parliamentary vice ministers and as committee
chairmen in the Diet were considered for the executive council (Thayer, 1973). Today,
however, members of the executive council are younger officials who have not necesarily
attained such status. In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Urano stated:
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At an early stage of the history of the LDP, a member of the executive
council had to be a person who had served as a minister. Gradually the
members became younger. After the LDP became an opposition party [in
1993], this tendency was accelerated. The current members were selected
through the discussion and consultation among faction leaders. The
number of times having been elected is also taken into consideration as is
the recommendation from a group of Diet persons who have served the
same number of terms (Personal communication, December 28, 1994).
The current emphasis in youth in the executive council is explained by the need
for party refonn The LDP leaders wish to improve the morale of the younger LDP Diet
persons, notably after the LDP lost power to a coalition government led by lchro Ozawa
in 1993.
It follows from what has been said that the three official decision making organs
are ceremonious to a large extent. It is the PARC that plays the most significant role in
the decision making system of the LDP.
The Decision Making Organization III
(Political Affairs Research Council)
The Political Affairs Research Council (PARC) was established "for study,
research, and planning of policy" (Party Law, Art. 39). PARC is made up of 17 divisions
(Party Law, Art. 40).

Besides 17 divisions, there are investigative commissions

(chosakai), committees (iinkai), and special committees (tokubetsu iinkai). Sato &
Matsuzaki ( 1986) state that the function of the division is to formulate specific policies.
On the other hand, the functions of the investigative commissions, committees, and
special committees are to establish a goal for the policies of the LDP and to clarify the
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interests of the Diet persons concerned. According to 1993 PARC membership lists, the
functions of the investigative commissions and special committees are to investigate
political issues from a long range perspective and to formulate policy as the result of
extensive deliberations.
It is difficult to distinguish the difference among the investigative commissions,
committees, and special committees. Thayer (1973) wrote that the special committees
deal with more particular problems than the investigative commissions. Sato & Matsuzaki
(1986) stated that there are no differences among the three organs mentioned above.
However, the 15 committees existing as of 1994 have one common feature. All of them
are related to the policies which promote development in specific areas of Japan. The 15
committees cover all of the regions of the country.
The basic unit of the PARC is the division, and it is within the divisions that
specific policies are formulated. The divisions of the PARC correspond to the ministries
and the standing committees of the Diet. These divisions include cabinet affairs, local
government, national defense, foreign affairs, judicial affairs, financial affairs,
construction, social affairs, labor affairs, commerce and industry, fisheries, educational
affairs, science and technology, environmental affairs, transportation, post and
telecommunication, and agriculture and fishery.
Every LOP Diet persons has to belong to one of the divisions (Party Law, Art.
44). In genera� LOP Diet persons are permitted to belong to three divisions. Some Diet
persons, however, serve in four divisions because Diet persons have to belong to divisions
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which correspond to the standing cormnittees they seive. Besides these, Diet persons can
belong to two other divisions (lnoguchi & Iwai, 1994). For example, Diet person Seiko
Noda is a member of the Commerce and Industry and the Environment Committees in the
lower house. She belongs to the commerce and industry, environmental affairs, social
affairs, and foreign affairs divisions of the PARC (Membership lists of the PARC, 1993).
In an inteiview with this author, Diet person Noda said, "I chose the social affairs and
foreign affairs divisions because I am interested in these issues" (Personal communication,
December 26, 1994).
In the division, zoku Diet persons (informal policy support Diet persons) take
initiatives for the formulation of the policy. The detail of the zoku Diet persons will be
discussed in the next chapter. Although bureaucrats have the expertise to formulate
policies, zoku Diet persons also have enough knowledge to alter the ideas of the
bureaucrats. In many cases, the initial policy plans are formulated by bureaucrats, and
those plans are submitted to the division. However, zoku Diet persons sometimes request
bureaucrats to formulate policies which are in line with the interests of the LDP
(Kawakita, 1991).
The Roles of the President, the Secretary General,
and Informal Leaders Meetings
As mentioned, members of the formal decision making organs leave their decision
making power to the president, the secretary general, or the meetings of party officials
when they can not reach an unanimous agreement. In the following part, the roles of the
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two top leaders in the LDP, the president, and the secretary general, will be explained.
This will be followed by an explanation of the informal meetings of the party leaders.
I: The President
Among party leaders, the president is the top leader in the party hierarchy. Under
the LDP administration, the president was also the prime minister. The prime minister in
Japan is selected by the Diet persons. The Japanese Constitution gives the House of
Representatives the authority to select the prime minister (Japanese Constitution, Art. 67).
When the LDP had a majority in the lower house, the party president of the LDP became
the prime minister automatically. The current LDP president, Yohei Kono, became the
first LDP president since 1955 who was not a prime minister.
Hayao (1993) maintains that the following four qualifications are necessary for a
person to become president. The first is that it is necessary to be a faction leader. All
of the past 16 LDP presidents except three were either the formal head or acting heads
of their factions. Three exceptions, Sousuke Uno, Toshiki Kaifu, and Yohei Kono were
among the top leaders within their factions.
The second qualification is that it is necessary for a person to be a member of the
lower house. Neither the Constitution nor the Party Law prohibit members of the upper
house from becoming the president. However, all of the past presidents were members
of the lower house. Moreover, all of the past faction leaders and party executives were
also members of the lower house. In addition, most of the ministerial posts have been

66
dominated by members of the lower house. As of 1995, 11 out of 13 ministers who
belonged to the LDP were members of the lower house.
The Constitution gives the lower house the ultimate authority to make decisions
on bills and budgets as well as the selection of the prime minister. Thus, the lower house
has an advantage over the upper house.
The third qualification is that it is necessary for a person to be a senior member
of the Diet. Hayao (1993) observed that all of the presidents who were inaugurated since
1974 (after the resignation of Kakuei Tanaka) served in the Diet at least IO terms ·before
their inauguration as president. It should be noted that at an early stage in the LDP
history, presidents served a relatively small number of terms in the Diet. The second party
president, Tanzan Ishibashi, was inaugurated when he was in his fourth term in the Diet.
The third party president, Nobusuke Kishi, was inaugurated when he was in his fourth
term in the Diet. The fourth president, Hayato Ikeda, was inaugurated when he was in
his fifth term in the Diet. The fifth president, Eisaku Sato, was inaugurated when he was
in his seventh term in the Diet.
As the LOP continued to be the dominant party, the number of terms a person was
elected became an important element in becoming president. This change can be
interpreted as a shift from the merit system to the seniority system. In the 1950s and early
1960s under a chaotic situation after World War II, a charismatic style of leadership was
necessary for one to become a top leader of the party. Considering the fact that
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promotion in organizations in Japan has been related to seniority, the existence of the
merit system in the early stage of the LDP history was unusual.
The fourth qualification is that it is necessary for a person to be a "relative youth"
(Hayao, 1993). Hayao points out that the mean age at which the LDP prime minister
assumed office was 65. No matter how important the seniority system is to the LDP, no
presidents were older than 72 when they were inaugurated.
The rule for selecting the president has been changed eight times since 1955.
Although the rule was altered frequently, one provision still exists and that is that the
president must be elected.
According to the rule for the selection of the president which was revised in 1995,
the president is to be elected by the LDP Diet persons and party members of which there
were about 1.5 million persons as of 1995 (Jiminsousaisen, 1995). Each Diet person has
one vote, and every I 0.000 votes of the party members is calculated as one vote
(Jiminsousaisen, 1995. If a candidate wins a majority of the valid vote, he/she becomes
president. In the case that no candidates receives a majority of the valid vote, a run-off
election between the two candidates who received the largest number of votes is held.
The candidate who receives the larger number of votes will become the president
(Jiminsousaisen, 1995).
As mentioned above, the rule mandating the election of the president has often
been ignored. Among the past 23 party presidents, 10 presidents were selected by
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negotiation or consultation. Even in cases when the presidents were elected, negotiations
and consultations took place in order to decide who should be elected (Tanaka, 1986).
Party leaders, especially faction leaders, have played significant roles in the
negotiations and consuhations in selecting presidents. "The factions are the basis for the
presidential election" (Thayer, 1973, p. 161). Conversely, the factions existed in order
for faction leaders to become presidents with the support of their followers.
The influence of the faction can be recognized clearly in the selections of the
following presidents: Sousuke Uno in June 1986, Toshiki Kaifu in August 1986, and
Kiichi Miyazawa in 1991. Each of these men became presidents through the support of
Noboru Takeshita who was the faction leader of the largest faction at that time. From all
appearances, Kaifu and Miyazawa were elected by ballot, however, the results were
determined before the elections (Ishikawa, 1995). In reality, when Takeshita decided to
support these candidates, their victories were assured.
As has been previously discussed, the selection of the president by negotiation or
consultation can be described as a manifestation of Japanese culture which emphasizes
harmony in a group. In other words, the way of selecting the LOP president is in
harmony with traditional Japanese culture. By deciding who will become president
through negotiation or consultation, LOP Diet persons try to avoid serious conflict within
the party.
Sometimes an unexpected person is selected as the president in order to keep
hannony in the party. The selection of the president in 1974 is an example of this. After
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the resignation of Tanaka as prime minister because of the Lockheed Scandal, three
faction leaders, Masayoshi Ohira, Takeo Fukuda, and Takeo Miki expressed strong
interest in becoming president. Ohira, who was backed by the Tanaka faction, insisted
that the president should be elected. The other two candidates insisted that the president
should be selected by negotiation. Each candidate was so adamant in his position that he
maintained that if his position were ignored, he would leave the party (Ishikawa, 1995).
In order to a':'oid a split in the party, party leaders finally agreed to yield their
decision making power to the LDP vice president, Motoo Shiina. Shiina's decision was
based on three principles: (I) faction leaders of the major factions should not be selected
as president in order to avoid factional conflict; (2)a person who has a long career as a
Diet person and has a clean public image should be selected; (3) a person, who has the
support of every faction leader should be selected (Sone & Kanazashi, 1989).
In the end, Takeo Miki, who was a faction leader of one of the smallest factions,
was selected as the president of the LDP, that is, the prime minister of Japan. When Miki
was appointed prime minister, he said, "This is like a bolt from the blue" (Uchida, 1989,
p. 59). It may be irrational to select a person who did not intend to be a prime minister,
however, this selection prevented the party from falling into total confusion.
It is apparent that although the party president is a top leader of the LDP, he/she
is not always very powerful. It is difficult to identify the kind of role the president plays
in the party. It depends on president's personality and mindset. For example, Prime
Minister Miki could not exercise effective leadership in the party because his prime
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rninistership was a consequence of compromise among influential faction leaders. On the
other hand, the presidents who have been leaders of large factions, or presidents who
were supported by a majority of the factions, could wield enough power to execute their
policies. Eisaku Sato, Kakuei Tanaka, and Yasuhiro Nakasone are examples of the latter.
The formal election of the president of the LDP is also circumvented for another
reason. Huge sums of money have often been spent in presidential elections to buy votes
(See, Iwai, 1990, Hayao, 1993, Sone & Kanazashi, 1989, and Thayer, 1973). For
example, retired LDP Diet person Koichi Hamada (1994) wrote that when Nakasone was
reelected as the president, he gave one billion yen (approximately$ 10 million) to Kakuei
Tanaka. The support of the Tanaka faction was essential for Nakasone to be reelected.
Not all presidential elections are corrupt, however indeed, the presidential election
in 1993 was exceptionally "clean". In an interview with this author, Diet person Seiko
Noda said, "No money was delivered in this election. In fact, no one knew who would
win the election" (Personal communication, December 26, 1994).
II: The Secretary General
The second powerful person in the LDP is the secretary general. Among the 15
LDP prime ministers since 1955, eight of them held the position of secretary general. The
secretary general is appointed by the president with the consent of the executive council
(Party Law, Art. 9). Although this position has been considered very important, no
detailed description exists concerning his power in the LDP Party Law. The LDP Party
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Law just states, "The secretary general assists the party president and manages party
affairs" (Party Law, Art. 8).
Thayer (1973) states that although the formal responsibilities of the secretary
general are vague, the following responsibilities can be recognized. Those are: "collecting
and distributing party funds, handing out posts within the party, government, the Diet,
assisting in policy decisions, quarterbacking election campaigns, overseeing the party
secretariat, managing legislation in the Diet, and directing the press campaigns on behalf
of the party" (p. 274). Among these responsibilities, the power to appoint persons to
party and government posts and controlling the party funds are considered the most
significant (ltagaki, 1993 and Ohmiya, 1994).
The secretary general appoints the parliamentary vice ministers and the chainnen
of the standing committees in the lower house (Thayer, 1973). Those appointments are
largely influenced by the opinions of the faction leaders. In an interview with this author,
Diet person Yasuoki Urano stated, "At first, I wanted to be a parliamentary vice minister
of the MITI. However, I had to give up that post because it was allocated to a Diet
person who belonged to another faction" (Personal communication, December 28, 1994).
Giving up the post was the result of the negotiation among faction leaders.
The secretary general does not always have the power to determine who could
become authorized candidates for Diet persons. As of 1995, the vice president of the
LDP, Keizo Obuchi, had the responsibility to decide who should be the authorized LDP
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candidates for LDP (Jimintounai, 1995). He was a faction leader, and apparently, in a
superior position to the secretary general, Yoshiro Mori.
It should be noted that becoming the secretary general does not mean that a
person acquires the power inherent in that position. That power is based on the political
ability of the person and the degree of support he/she can get from other Diet persons.
This is also true for the president of the party.
The power to raise funds and control finance varies with each secretary general.
Not all of the secretary generals have controlled party funds. Former Secretary General
Takeo Miki was considered as a week secretary general because he was not good at
raising funds. Furthermore, an influential faction leader has at times controlled the party
budget. Under the Ohira and the Nakasone administrations, the secretary generals were
selected by Kakuei Tanaka. Under the Uno and the Kaifu administrations, the secretary
generals were selected by Noboru Takeshita. Under these administrations, Tanaka and
Takeshita, who were powerful faction leaders, controlled the party budget (ltagaki,
1993).
Even though the secretary general is still considered to be the second most
powerful position in the LDP, the character of the position has changed since the
inauguration of Prime minister Takeo Miki in 1974. Until the Tanaka administration
( 1972-1974), the secretary general had customarily come from the same faction as the
president. In addition, the financial accounts bureau chief, who is regarded as one of the
key persons in party finance, came from the same faction as the secretary general. These
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custoffi'i were abolished with the Miki Administration ( 1974-1976). During the Tanaka
Administration (1972-1974), Tanaka controlled the party budget as well as the party and
government posts. After the Lockheed Scandal was unveiled, many LDP Diet persons
and citizens began to criticize the power concentrated in one faction. Therefore, party
leaders started to select the president, the secretary general, and the finance account
bureau chief from different factions.
III: Informal Leaders' Meetings
As mentioned above, members of the executive council often leave their decision
making power to the president or to infonnal leaders' meetings. Generally, there are three
kinds of informal leaders' meetings. They are: the Three Leaders' meetings, the Six
Leaders' meetings and the party officials' meeting.
The Three Leaders' meeting is attended by the secretary general, the chairman of
the PARC, and the chainnan of the executive council. Sometimes the vice president takes
part in the meeting to form the Four Leaders' meeting. The Six Leaders' meeting is
attended by the same persons as the Four Leaders' meeting plus the prime minister and
the chief cabinet secretary (Thayer, 1973). These meetings are not mentioned in the Party
Law. However, they play a significant role when controversial issues are discussed in the
party. Particularly, final decisions are often made on controversial issues in the Three
Leaders' meeting (Itagaki, 1993).

74
Another decision making organ is the party officials' meetings which is composed
of the same members as the Four Leaders' meeting plus the chairman of national
organization committee, the chairman of the public relation committee, and the chairman
of the Diet policy committee (Thayer, 1973). (The national organization committee and
the public relations committee were combined to create the national organization and
public relation committee in 1995.) In 1995, this organ changed its name to the party
officials' conference for changing information (yakuin renrakukai). This organ, however,
has the same function as the old one: enhancing cooperation among the various party
organs and promoting the efficient management of the party concerns (Party Law, Art.
23). Figure 4 shows the makeup of the three informal meetings of the LDP top leders.
In 1995, the LDP party officials' conference was newly established. The party
Law stipulates that this is the official decision making organ (Party Law, Art. 22).
Secretary General Mori stated "We are going to discuss the issues for which the
discussions of politicians are required (in the party officials' conference)" (Jirninshintaisei,
1995). There are, however, no clear descriptions in the Party Law concerning what kinds
of issues are to be discussed in this conference. Moreover, the position of this conference
within other official decision making organs is not also clear.
The party officials' conference is composed of the president, the vice president,
the secretary general, the chairman of the PARC, the chairman of the executive council,
the of the House of Councilors, the representative of the LDP members of the House of
Councilors, and the chairman of the national organization and public relation committee
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(Party Law, Art). Until 1995, leaders in the upper house had little opportunity to take
part in the decision making process. This conference, however, has two leaders belonging
to the upper house. This may be a manifestation of the movement of the LDP to make
the decision making process more democratic and open.
The Three Leaders' Meetings
o The secretary general
o The chairman of the PARC
o The chairman of the executive council
The Six Leaders' Meetings
o Members of the Three Leaders' Meetings +
o The vice president
o The prime minister
o The chief cabinet secretary
The Party Officials' Meetings (The Party Officials' Conference for Changing Information)
o Members of the Three Leaders' Meetings +
o The chairman of national organization committee
o The chairman of the public relation committee
0 The chairman of the Diet policy committee
Figure 4. Informal Meetings of the LDP Top Leaders.
Conclusion
The decision making process of the LDP is unclear. The discussion in this chapter
identified three reasons for this. First, most of the decisions are made before issues are
brought to official decision making organs. The function of these organs are ceremonial.
Second, members of the official decision making organs sometimes leave their decision
making powers to the president or to informal meetings of the party leaders. Third, the
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roles ofthe two top leaders, the president and the secretary general, are not clear. There
are no specific descriptions concerning their responsibilities in the Party Law.
These characteristics are the reflections ofone principle which penneates the LDP,
that is, the concept ofhannony. Official decision making organs are ceremonial because
consensus has already been achieved before the discussion take place in these organs. It
is impossible for LDP Diet persons to express objections at the party conference because
this disturbs harmony in the party. There are sometimes heated debates in the executive
council. However, this is a part of the process in reaching unanimous agreement.
Furthennore, without party consensus, the president and the secretary general can not
wield power.

CHAPTERIV
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND THE LDP
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationships between the business
community and the LDP. These relationships are some of the most significant factors that
contributed to maintaining the LDP as the most powerful and stable party for 40 years.
The close ties that exist between business communities and political parties are not
uncommon in other countries. However, an examination of those relationships in this
chapter will clarify the unique characteristics of the issues concerning money and LDP
politics. This examination will also clarify the close relationships between the LDP and
the opposition parties which have been discussed in the previous chapter.
Farmers and business owners including big business leaders have been the main
supporters of the LDP. Table 1 presents the results of an opinion pole concerning the
relationships between occupation and public support for the LDP and the SDPJ. As
would be expected, the LDP is more popular among business owners and people working
in primary sectors e.g., farming, fishery, and forestry, than is the Social Democratic Party
of Japan (SDPJ).
However, as the number of farmers has decreased, their influence has also
declined. In 1955, the farmers provided 43% of the total support of the LDP, but their
77
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support dropped to 15% in 1980 (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1993). Furthermore, Curtis
(1988) points out that there are only 22 rural districts in the lower house's 130 election
districts. Then decrease in the number of farmers was brought about by industrialization
and population movements from the countryside to the city.
Table 1
Party Support by Occupation, 1989
Percentage Within Each Social Group
LDP

SDPJ

White collar workers and managers

21

24

Blue collar workers in manufacturing

19

27

Blue collar workers in retail

22

23

Small or medium size business owners

36

16

Farming, fishery and forestry

41

17

Source:

Hachijukyunen saninsenkyo to seito saihen.
By I. Miyake, 1992,
LEVIATHAN: The Japanese Journal of Political Science, 10, p. 36.
On the other hand, the number of small business owners has not changed so much

since 1955. In 1955, small business owners provided 25% of the total support of the
LDP, and in 1980, they provided 23% (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, 1993).

There is no

doubt that the business community, including various kinds of interest groups representing
industrial groups, is the most important supporter of the LDP. The business community
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supplies not only votes but also money. "The main party funding comes from industry
and business associations" (Rothacher, 1993).
The Business Community
Before examining the relationships between the business community and the LDP,
it is necessary to explain what the business community is. Thayer (1973) categorized it
into four groups. The first group includes the leaders of the basic industries such as steel,
gas, the electric power, and banks. These industries have led the Japanese economy since
the pre-World War II era. The second group includes the representatives of the four
major economic organizations. Those are Keidanren (the Federation of Economic
Organizations), Nikkeiren (the Japan Federation of Employers' Organizations), Doyukai
(the Japan Committee for Economic Development), and Nissho (the Japan Chamber of
Commerce and Industry). Many of the companies or leaders of those companies in the
first group belong to one of these four organizations.
Keidanren is the representative of big business in Japan. The members of
Keidanren include 916 of Japan's largest corporations and 119 industry-wide groups
representing major industries such as mining, manufacturing, trade, finance, and
transportation. The functions of this group are adjusting and mediating different opinions
among its various companies, and submitting proposals concerning economic policy to
the government (Campbell & Noble, 1993). Nikkeiren is a nationwide organization of
managers of business organizations, and includes a membership of 102 industrial groups
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(Ohmiya, 1994).

The function of this organization is to promote healthy labor

management relations. It has determined management policy in labor disputes and
provided guidance to member organizations for solving them (Campbell & Noble, 1993).
Nikkeiren also submits proposals to the government on labor policies. Doyukai, which
consists of 1583 business leaders, was formed to give young executives an organizational
base to consider economic recovery and development. It is, however, substantially an
organization to give Keidanren members opportunities to discuss economic issues
(Curtis, 1975). There is a considerable overlap of membership between Doyukai and
Keidanren. Nissho has a membership of 1.5 million companies (Ohmiya, 1994). The
function of this organization is to formulate and promote the opinions of small and
medium size companies as well as large companies (Thayer, 1973).
The third group is composed of the owners of the relatively new companies which
developed after the Second World War such as Matsushita Electronic Industries, Idemitsu
Oil Company, Honda Motor Company, and Bridgstone Tire Company. The fourth group
is made up of the representatives of small and medium-sized companies.

The

representatives of industrial federations are also included in the fourth group. Those
includes the Sake (rice wine) Brewers' Federation, Life Insurance Federation and Taxi
Association (Thayer, 1973).
Thayer ( 1973) asserts that the members in the first two groups, that is, major
companies or companies belonging to economic organizations, are the most important
for the LDP because they are the main financial contributors. However, smaller and
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medium sized companies are also important to the LDP. Iwai (1990) argues that as the
amount ofdonations to the LDP has increased, the ratio ofthe donation from big business
in the total amount of the donation has decreased, and as a result, it accelerated the
decline of the power of the big business to propose changes in LDP economic policy.
lwai points out that from 1976 to 1986, the political fund of the LDP increased three
times. On the other hand, the donation for the LDP collected by the big business
increased only 1. 7 times.

Obviously, the donation of the small and medium size

companies increased more rapidly than that of big business.
Curtis (1975) states that the influence of big business on the LDP started to
decline during the Eisaku Sato Administration (1964-1972). Sato's predecessor, Hayato
Ikeda, established close personal relationships with small numbers of top business leaders.
Sato, however, made efforts to expand the connections with business leaders beyond a
group of industrial leaders that shared links with Ikeda. When Sato was inaugurated as
a prime minister, the strains caused by economic policy made by the Ikeda Administration
became apparent. In the 1975 official publication of the LDP, Jiyuuminshuytou niiunen
no ayumi [The history ofthe LDP of20 years], the LDP argues that Sato recognized that
the economic policy made by the LDP in the early 1960s caused an overemphasis on the
development of heavy and chemical industries. As a result, small companies were
excluded from this policy, and as such they did not receive benefits as many as big
companies. Furthermore, anti-pollution measures and social welfare programs were
ignored in the rapid development of Japanese economy.
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Sato intended to reduce the influence of big business in order to implement
policies to solve these problems. Sato's successor, Kakuei Tanaka accelerated this
tendency. Tanaka did not rely heavily on Japan's leading businessmen, but relied instead
on "newly wealthy businessmen" (Curtis, 1975). As will be discussed later, small and
medium sized businesses and the LDP are in a reciprocal relationship and have come even
closer together since the 1970s.
The Communications Between the Business Community and the LDP
The next point to be examined is what kinds of communication exist between the
business community and the LDP. The four economic organizations mentioned above
have committees to research various kinds of issues and submit a paper to the
government. For example, Keidanren has a committee of economic policy, a committee
for encouraging development of the universe, a committee for defense industry. Also, it
has been studying diplomacy, education and the environment (Iga, 1993). The influence
of big business on economic policies through these official channels is not as significant
as it has been in the past. For official announcements made by Keidanren, one top ranking
bureaucrat of the Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI) said, "There was
nothing to serve as a reference.... Keidanren announced only his demands" (Keidanren,
1995).
Business leaders also officially influence the decision making of the government
as members of advisory committees (Shingikai) (Curtis, 1975). Shingikai is a collegial
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or advisory body attached to a central government administrative organ that investigates
issues related to each organ. However, the power ofShingikai is limited for two reasons.
First, the selection ofthe members is largely influenced by the intention of the government
agencies. So, the result ofthe research conducted by a Shingikai is often in line with the
governmental policies (Amano, 1994).

Second, a Shingikai is not empowered to

determine public policies or act as an enforcement agency but only to collect information
and advise the government.
Informal relationships between business leaders and the LDP Diet persons have
been more significant than formal relationships between them. As mentioned before,
some prime ministers have been assisted by business leaders through personal
connections. Ichiro Hatoyama became the first LDP prime minister with the support of
big business. Keidanren played a significant role in uniting two conservative parties to
form the LDP with Hatoyama as prime minister (Hanamura, 1990). Furthermore, the vice
chairman of Keidanren established a fund raising system for the LDP. Ironically,
Hatoyama had to resign two months after the chairman ofKeidanren visited Hatoyama
to press him to resign. The business community was strongly opposed to Hatoyama's
policy ofreestablishing diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union (Hanamura, 1990). There
is no evidence that Hatoyama's resignation was due to the request from the business
community. However, this is one of the episodes indicating a close relationship between
the LDP and the business community. Hatoyama's successor, Hayato Ikeda, was also
supported by the "four emperors" in the business world. Those were the presidents ofa
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bank, a newspaper company, a textile company, and a steel company. They established
an informal club to back up Ikeda, more precisely, to make Ikeda a prime minister in
1957, one year before his inauguration (Uchida, 1989).
As mentioned, after the Sato Administration, the extreme influence of the business
leaders on the LDP gradually decreased. However, close relationships between the LDP
and the business community based on informal clubs has not disappeared. Sato made use
of clubs to maintain business-government communication.
The meeting of the clubs is held in an informal setting such as a geisha restaurant
(Trezise, 1976). Traditionally, a first class Japanese restaurant or geisha house is often
used as the place where important political and economic issues are discussed. The
decisions made in such an informal meeting become formal decisions. Curtis (1975)
writes, "Geisha houses in Akasaka and Shinbashi become the power centers where an elite
meets over sake to determine Japan's future" (p.46).
On the negative side of these informal ties, the relationship among the participants
can easily become corrupt. A retired LDP Diet person, Koichi Hamada (1994) describes
the corruptive relationship between former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and one
of his advisors, Ryuzo Sejima, who was also a counselor for the Itochu Corporation, one
of Japan's major general trading companies. Hamada argues that although Nakasone's
predecessor, Zenko Suzuki, rejected a request of 6 billion dollars for economic assistance
from South Korea, Nakasone offered 4 billion dollars of economic assistance with 3
billion dollars coming from private companies. Itochu Corporation was the company
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which benefited most by this project, becoming the top trading company in dealings with
South Korea.
Marriage and family ties between the LDP Diet persons and business leaders are
also one of the manifestations of close relationships between them. Examples of them
abound. A son of former prime minister Noboru Takeshita married a daughter of the
president of the largest construction company in Niigata Prefecture. A wife of Yohei
Kono, who is the president of the LDP, is a daughter of the chairman of a large textile
company (Ohmiya, 1994). Nakasone's daughter married a son of the chairman of one of
the biggest construction companies in Japan (Hamada, 1994).
It is not clear to what extent these informal ties between the business community
and the LDP have affected Japanese politics. However, it is necessary to take these
informalities into consideration in analyzing Japanese politics. Curtis (197 5) asserts that
informal communication between LDP Diet persons and business leaders are particularly
important in Japan.
The next question to be examined is what are the benefits that the business
community receives through a close relationship with the LDP. There is little doubt that
during the Cold War Era, the top priority for the business community in supporting the
LDP was to ensure that the LDP developed the capitalist system (Fukushima, 1989, and
Thayer, 1973). This ideological reason has little importance under the current domestic
and international situations.

Domestically, there is little possibility for the Japan
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Communist Party (JCP) to come into power. Internationally, there is also little possibility
that Russia or China might invade Japan.
The demands of the business community are practical and diverse. The economic
organizations mentioned above have announced various demands for the government.
Those include amendment of the laws related to economic deconcentration, lenient
taxation, price control by the government, the development of atomic power and defense
industries, international economic co-operation (Fukui, 1970). In fact, it is a well-known
fact that the Japanese government, along with MJTI, has protected key industries through
preferential treatment such as giving large subsidies, infant industry protection, export
promotion, and buy-Japanese programs (Okimoto, 1989).
The LDP has protected small and medium-sized businesses as well as big
businesses. Small business is sensitive to particular economic issues (Patrick & Rhoten,
1987). Because the interests of small business are often local, small businesses tend to
support whoever responds to their demands. In fact, at the beginning of the 1970s, some
small business leaders, who felt that they were alienated from rapid economic
development policy of the government, started to support the JCP (Okimoto, 1989).
Therefore, the LDP has to offer more benefits to small businesses.
Small businesses are also important in terms of their numbers. Although the
population of Japan is about half of that of the United States, the number of small-scale
enterprises in Japan and the United States are almost same (Inoguchi, 1990). Almost one
third of the laborers in Japan work in small-scale family enterprises (Patrick & Rohlen,
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1987). These facts show that small business can provide the LDP not only with funding
but also with significant numbers of votes.
The LDP's lenient taxation policy toward small business has been a notable
example of its support for the small business (Inoguchi, 1990, and Okimoto, 1989).
Moreover, it has been an open secret that the tax evasion by the small business has been
largely ignored (Patrick & Rohlen, 1987). The LDP sometimes provided benefits for
small business while sacrificing benefits for big business. In 1974, in order to protect
small local retailers, legislation was passed to regulate the establishment of large
supermarkets. It became more difficult for big retailers to open new stores.
Zoku Diet Persons
In the discussion of the relationships between the LDP and the business
community, it is necessary to explain the role of the powerful LDP zoku (informal policy
support groups). The zoku play the role of a lobbyist in the Diet and ministries not only
for the industrial federations of both big and small business, but also for various interest
groups such as those of farmers, fishermen, and medical professions. The zoku Diet
persons are "Diet members who have a considerable amount of expertise and practical
experience about a particular area of government policy and enough seniority in the party
to have influence on a continuing basis with the ministry responsible for that policy area"
(Curtis, 1988, p.114). Since the U.S. standing committee system was introduced to the
Japanese parliamentary system after World War II, lobbyists might be expected to have
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become important in Japan, too. However, "It is the parties themselves that act as
lobbyists in Japan" (Yamato, 1983).
In order to examine the role of the lobbyist-like zoku, it is necessary to explain the
Diet strategies of the LOP. The Diet Law stipulates that "the standing committees shall
examine the bills (including draft resolutions), petitions, and other matters which may
come under their respective spheres of work" (Chapter 5, Article, 41). There are 20
standing committees as of 1995. Those are the Cabinet, Local Administration, Judicial
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Social and Labor Affairs, Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, Commerce and Industry, Transportation, Communications,
Transport, Construction, Budget, Audit, House Management, Discipline, Science and
Technology, and Environment Committees. In the House of Councilors, there are the
same committees except for the Science and Technology and Environment Committees.
All of these committees except the budget, audit, house management, and
discipline committees correspond to the ministries of the cabinet. Committee members
are apportioned according to each party's representation in the House (The Diet Law,
Chapter 5, Article 46). In the LOP, the committees are allocated by the faction leaders
• conducted by this
in most cases. The LOP Diet person, Seiko Noda, said in an interview

author that "Members of committees are decided by faction leaders. I was told by my
faction leader to belong to the Environment and Commerce and the Industry Committees"
(Personal communication, December, 26, 1994).
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Regardless of the importance of the standing committee in the legislative process,
the Diet persons do not think it is so important. Baerwald (1974) states that "(Service
on a committee) is considered a duty or obligation (gimu) rather than an opportunity.
Most LDPers view committee deliberations as a waste of time " (p.94). Three reasons
account for this. First, if a controversial bill is brought to the committee, it is not a
discussion of the committee but an informal negotiation between the LOP and the
opposition parties that takes place. Diet persons decide whether or not a bill should be
passed, or how a bill should be amended. This informal negotiation will be discussed later
in this chapter.
Second, most of the bills brought to a committee are prepared by bureaucrats, and
the discussion at a committee is mostly ritualistic (Nakano, 1993). In an interview
conducted by this author, Diet person Takashi Kawamura said:
When the date was fixed for my asking questions at a Communication
Committee for the first time, one bureaucrat came to me and said, 'Shall
I prepare for your question?' I answered, 'No, thank you. I will do it by
myself because this is the long awaited opportunity.' The bureaucrat said
in surprise, 'It is a rare example!' (Personal communication, December,
19, 1994).
Because the information is dominated by the bureaucrats, most of the Diet persons
can not help asking for clarification about the questions they ask of the bureaucrats at the
standing committee. "The great power of the bureaucrats is their control of information"
(Thayer, 1973, p.228). Furthermore, even if a Diet person prepares questions for a
committee by him/herself, he/she has to show them to the government officials who are
going to answer those questions. Diet person Kawamura also said, "It is conventionally
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required to submit a questionnaire to the bureaucrats before asking questions of them"
(Personal communication, December, 19, 1994).
Third, every bill has to be discussed at the policy affairs research council (PARC)
of the LDP before being submitted to the Diet In other words, without going through
the PARC, no bills can be discussed at standing committees. "If there is anything
comparable to the American Congressional Committee in the Japanese decision-making
system, it is the division of the PARC and not the Diet's committees" (Curtis, 1988, p.
111).
In the PARC, discussions between government officials and relevant LDP zoku
Diet persons, who are related to particular interest groups or industries, are held. In the

.

1950s and 1960s, it was argued that in the PARC, the LDP Diet persons were too
dependent on the bureaucracy because their major source of expertise was the
bureaucracy (Curtis, 1975, and Thayer, 1973). Still, the influence of party leadership over
policy making in the PARC has grown stronger since the 1970s (See, Inoguchi & Iwai,
1994, Nakano, 1993, Sato & Matsuzaki, 1986, and Yamato, 1983). This is exactly the
result of the increase of the number of the zoku Diet persons: the more zoku Diet persons,
the more influence the LDP has on the policy making process.
As mentioned, divisions of the PARC are the places where zoku Diet persons
work for interest groups or industries they are related to. By working for particular
interest groups or industries, the Zoku Diet persons can strengthen their relationships with
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those groups. As a result, Diet persons can get political resources such as political funds,
information, and votes from the business community or interest groups.
In addition, the activities of Diet persons in the division are important for the
promotion of them in the party. In order to negotiate and mediate with other Diet
persons and bureaucrats, Diet persons have to become specialists in the areas with which
they are associated to. If their ability concerning their specialty are recognized by party
executives, it becomes a significant factor in becoming zoku Diet persons (Inoguchi &
Iwai, 1994).
It should be noted that the status ofzoku Diet persons is informal in the party and
in the government. Moreover, it is difficult to tell who are the zoku Diet persons and to
which zoku he/she belongs. Some membership lists of zoku Diet persons exist, but there
are differences among these lists. For example, Diet person Kabun Mutou is classified as
a commerce and industry zoku Diet person by Sato and Mochizuki (1986). On the other
hand, he is classified as a commerce and industry zoku Diet person and a agriculture and
forestry zoku Diet person by Inoguchi and Iwai (1994).
In an interview with this author, Diet person Mutou said, "I have served as the
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (during the Ohira Administration in 1979),
so I may be considered as an agriculture and forestry zoku Diet person" (Personal
communication, December 18, 1994). From this interview it was determined that he had
little interest in agriculture or in benefits for farmers. In fact, his constituency is not in
the rural areas, but in the urban areas. Although none of the four scholars, who classified
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the zoku Diet persons mentioned above, regarded Mutou as a social and welfare zoku Diet
person, he thinks of himself as a social and welfare zoku Diet person as well as a
commerce and industry zoku Diet person. Diet person Mutou said,
I am one of the leading specialists on social and welfare policies in the
LDP, and have close relationships with groups of disabled persons and
pensioners. In this area, I am at the same level as Diet person Ryuichi
Hashimoto. (He is known as a leading social and welfare zoku Diet
person.) (Personal communication, December 18, 1994).
Also ambiguous is what the requirements to become zoku Diet person are. Not
every Diet person can become a zoku Diet person. It takes time to get enough expertise
in formulating policies, and it also takes time to establish close relationships with the
leaders of business community or various interest groups. More importantly, it takes time
for Diet persons to influence the policy making process in a seniority system.
In aspiring to become a zoku Diet person an individual needs to determine which
positions have the capacity to influence the policy making process. According to the
membership lists of zoku Diet persons made by Sato and Matsuzaki ( 1986), most of the
zoku Diet persons had served as vice-chairmen of divisions or chairmen of divisions
related to their specialties. In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Urano
said:
The parliamentary vice-chairman does not have a powerful voice within
the party. . . . When I was the chairman of the commerce and industry
division, the increase of the car sales tax was a problem pending between
our division and the Finance Ministry.... I and several bureaucrats had
heated arguments about what rate of tax is appropriate.... In the end,
we compromised and decreased the tax from 6% to 4.5% (Personal
communication, December 28, 1994).
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Judging by this statement, a chairman of a division has a responsibility to negotiate
with bureaucrats and reach an agreement. Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) also argue that
decisions of important issues are often made in informal meetings among a chairman of
a division, other zoku Diet persons, and related bureaucrats. It can be concluded that
holding or having held as chairman of a division is one of the conditions to becoming a
zoku

Diet person.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the number of times one is elected is a

crucial element in the promotion of Diet persons. Therefore, the next question to be
considered is how many terms in the Diet is necessary to become a chairman of a division,
namely, a zoku Diet person. In order to answer this question, the steps of promotion of
Diet persons have to be examined.
No freshman Diet persons have official posts. In the second term, they can be a
director of a standing committee that works as a negotiator between bureaucrats and Diet
persons who ask questions at a committee meeting. In the third term, they can become
a vice-chairman of a division or a parliamentary vice-minister, and some of them, who are
highly valued by party executives, can become a chairman of a division (Jin, 1994). Thus,
it is clear that at least three terms in the Diet are necessary for the LOP Diet person to
become a zoku Diet person.
The seniority system is one of the crucial elements which characterizes Japanese
society. The LOP is not an exception. Nevertheless, promotions in the LOP are based
on merit to some extent judging by the fact that only some of the Diet persons in their
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third term become members of the zoku. Undoubtedly, this gives the LDP organizational
strength. Competition among the LDP Diet persons must be beneficial for the party.
The business community and various interest groups obtain benefits through zoku
Diet persons. The benefits they receive vary in each industry or interest group. One of
the most active industries is the construction industry. Conversely, the most popular zoku
among the LDP Diet persons is a construction zoku. According to the Membership List
of the PARC published in 1994, the largest division is the construction division with
membership of 124. As would be expected, the environment division, the interests of
which are often against the interests of the business community, is not as popular having
a membership of only 32.
As an example of the way the economic community receives benefits from the
LDP, the relationships between the LDP zoku Diet persons and the construction industry
will be examined.
Public work is an important source of revenue for about 520,000 construction
companies in Japan. About 700 billion yen (approximately $7 billion at an exchange rate
of ¥100 to the dollar) out of about 2400 billion yen ($24 billion) of the total ordered
construction come from public work (Ryuen, 1994). The close relationships between the
construction zoku Diet person and the construction industry are established in public
works.
Although prearranged bidding is illegal, it is common in Japan. Prearranged
bidding is called dango in Japanese. Prior to the submitting of bids, it has already been
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decided which company should be the low bidder on a particular contract based upon an
ongoing series of negotiations and established relationships (Campbell & Noble, 1993).
As for bidding on public works projects, government officials of the Construction
Ministry can decide which company should bid. However, the LDP zoku Diet persons
select the company which should bid by putting pressure on the bureaucrats in many cases
(See, Inoguchi & Iwai, 1993, Nakano, 1993, and Ryuen, 1994).
Dango (prearranged bidding) existed in the Meiji era (1868-1913). Until the
Second World War, dango was done under the control of the bureaucrats (Kasumi,
1993). The first Diet person who took the leadership of dango from the bureaucrats was
lchiro Kono (1898-1965), who was an influential faction leader. When Kono became the
Construction Minister in 1962, he forcibly obtained the leadership of dango by imposing
a demotion on the bureaucrats who opposed him on taking decision making power
pertaining to which company can be bid away from the bureaucrats (Kasumi, 1993).
Kakuei Tanaka, who served as prime minister from 1972 to 1974, was the person who
established the dango system which was led by the politicians.
Since then, it has been difficult for construction companies to receive an order for
public projects without giving contributions to the construction zoku Diet persons. One
executive of a large construction company said:
If my company did not belong to the Kenshinkai, [Kenshinkai was a group
of construction companies which consisted of 540 companies which were
organized to support former top ranking senior construction zoku Diet
person, Shin Kanemaru.] it would be impossible to receive an order for
public projects. So, we ordinarily contributed to him. In the winter and
summer, we have contributed money which ranges from 5 million yen
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summer, we have contributed money which ranges from 5 million yen
(about $50,000) to 50,000 yen (about $500) (Hirose, 1994, p. 100).
Spending Practices of the LDP
One of the most important benefits for LDP Diet persons to become members of
zoku is to collect political contributions. Therefore, the next questions to be examined
is why the LDP politicians and the party need a large amount of money or how they spend
money. A consideration of these issues will help to explain the characteristics of the LDP
politics. In other words, it will clarify the strengths and weakness of the LDP.
It is impossible to know the exact amount of annual political funding. The
political fund control law stipulates that donation over 50,000 yen (about $500) have to
be reported to the Ministry of Home Affairs, but it has been an open secret that parties
and politicians have not reported all of the money they collected. Since the 1980s, the
amount of annual political funding collected by both the LDP and opposition parties has
been about 300 billion yen (about $3 billion)judged from an official report (Kyujusannen,
1994 ). However, if other revenues such as secret contributions, bribes, and stock
revenues are included, annual political funds of all the Japanese parties exceed one trillion
yen (approximately $10 billion) (Iwai, 1990)
Judging by the officially reported political funding, the JCP collected the largest
amount of money. In 1993, the incomes of the JCP, the LDP, the SDPJ, and the Komei
Party were about 31 billion yen, 15 billion yen, 6.8 billion yen, and 3.1 billion yen
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respectively (Kakutou, 1995). However, it should not be concluded that the JCP is the
most affluent party in Japan.
Comparing the sources of income of the JCP and the LDP will illustrate that the
source of income of the LDP is more ambiguous than that of the JCP. About 90% of the
party revenue of the JCP is earned by operating businesses, and only 1% come from
contnbution (Iwai, 1990). The largest business run by the JCP is a newspaper publishing
company. On the other hand, about 60% of the revenue of the LDP comes from
contnbutions, and the amount of the revenue from operating businesses is only about 10%
(lwai, 1990).
The LDP can be characterized as the party which is most heavily dependent on
contribution. As will be explained later, illegal contributions have been common in Japan.
That makes the political funding of the LDP unclear. In fact, Fukui and Fukai (1991)
argue that at the end of the 1980s, it was not unusual that one company donated secretly
one billion yen (about $ IO million) annually to the executives of the LDP. These
contributions are supplied not only for the party and factions, but also individual
politicians. However, informal contributions are mainly made for individual politicians.
The average annual expenditure of one LDP Diet person in a non election year is
estimated to be about l 00 million yen or 150 million yen (about $1 or $1.5 million) (See,
lwai, 1990, Hirose, 1994, and Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). In addition, in an election year,
the LDP politicians usually spend twice as much money as in an ordinary year.
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Of the expenditure of 100 or 150 million yen, approximately 40 million yen are
spent for salaries of secretaries and staff members, and for the maintenance of offices
(Iwai, 1990, and Hirose, 1994). Because of the other expenditures, the LOP politicians
need a lot of money. Those are disbursements for elections and for maintaining koenkai.
Those are related to each other.

.

An election campaign in Japan is extraordinarily expensive. According to the
survey conducted by the Asahi Newspaper, in the 1986 lower house election, each LOP
candidate spent on the average about 100 million yen (about $1 million) ( Fukui & Fukai,
1991) This expenditure is very high compared with that in the United States. In the 1988
election in the United States, candidates for the House of Representative spent about $
280,000 on the average (Magleby & Nelson, 1990).
Unlike campaigns in the United States, candidates spend no money for a media
campaign in Japan. The main reason for the high cost of the campaign of the LOP
politicians is that most of the LOP politicians have to spend money to maintain and
mobilize their own koenkai (See, Curtis, 1988, lwai, 1990, Fukui & Fukai, 1991, and
Hirose, 1994). Koenkai is significant for the LOP politicians in the sense that koenkai
members work as a political machine not only for collecting votes, but also for raising
funds. Ironically, the cost to maintain koenkai and mobilize it in election campaigns is
very high. The details of koenkai will be discussed in the next chapter.
The expenditures to maintain koenkai are related to Japanese custom. As
discussed in the previous chapter, it is a Japanese custom to give presents in winter and
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in summer and is also to bring money to weddings and funerals. In addition, the Japanese
people give presents or money in token of gratitude. "Japan is a society in which gift
giving (and money-giving) is commonplace upon introductions or requests for assistance
from other more senior or prestigious people" (Hrebenar, 1986).
It is important for the Diet persons to attend weddings and funerals because by
attending these ceremonies, politicians can strengthen their ties with koenkai members
and their families. Fonner Director General of the Environment Agency, Masahisa Aoki
(1994) writes in his reminiscences:
To attend funerals is the best way to collect votes. It has been commonly said
that constructing bridges or school buildings in the constituency creates votes, but
that is an old story. . . . If top ranking koenkai members die, I will attend their
funerals by absenting myself from the Diet session (pp. 88-89).
Failing to attend funerals sometimes creates disaster for politicians. Aoki (1994)
writes that one influential koenkai. member withdrew from his koenkai because Aoki did
not attend a funeral of that member's father. Aoki writes that he or his secretaries attend
about 350 or 400 funerals of his supporters or their family members every year. This
situation is not unique. According to the survey conducted by Asahi Newspaper, the
average number of funerals that a politician attends a month is 26.5 times, and the
average number of weddings he/she attends is 9.6 a month (Hirose, 1994).
The average annual expenditure for wedding ceremonies and funerals by the LOP
Diet persons is estimated at about 16 million yen, roughly $160.000 at an exchange rate
of 100 yen to the dollar (Iwai, 1990 and Hirose, 1994 ). The opposition Diet persons
spend rrruch less for these ceremonies than the LOP politicians do. The opposition Diet
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persons spend about 2 million yen (about $20,000) annually for wedding ceremonies and
funerals (Iwai, 1990).
These facts show that personal relationships between the LDP Diet persons and
supporters are closer than those between the opposition politicians and their supporters.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, koenkai for the LDP politicians are more numerous
and more active than those for the opposition Diet persons. Viewed in this light, it is
natural that the LDP politicians put a great deal of effort into maintaining good
relationships with their supporters, and as a result, they spend a lot of money on their
supporters.
The next expenditures to be discussed are deeply related to the Diet strategy of
the LDP. In the previous chapter, the extraordinary dependent relationships among the
LDP and the opposition parties were examined. In the consensus reaching procedure to
pass a bill, the kokutai (Diet Strategy Committee) members of the LDP give money to the
opposition parties. The successful functioning of the kokutai is one of the important
elements for the LDP to maintain a one-party dominant administration in Japan. Still, the
activities of the kokutai is costly.
Within the House of Representatives, there is a Management Committee. During
meetings of this committee, official discussions take place among the parties to make the
legislative process smooth and quick. However, substantial discussions are not held in
this committee. Obi (1990) argues that meetings of Management Committee are in many
cases ritualistic because agreement among the LDP and the opposition parties is made

101
before this meeting. The main duty of the Management Committee is to arrange a
procedure related to the vote or schedule of the discussion of standing committee, not to
resolve the fundamental differences of opinions among the LDP and the opposition parties
(Nakano, 1992).
Although the kokutai is an informal organization only affiliated with the party, the
function of it is significant in the sense that it supplements the task of the official
organization. The kokutai was established during the second Diet session in 1947 under
the Katayama Administration (Obi, 1990). Fonner LDP Diet person Koichi Hamada
( 1994) argues that the Katayama Administration was a coalition government under the
chaotic situation after the World War II. As a result, cooperation between the
conse1vatives and opposition parties was essential to implementing a significant plan like
the promulgation of the constitution and the first election by the new election law.
The function of kokutai was enhanced during the Tanaka Administration (19721974) (The department of politics of the Asahi Newspaper, 1992). During this era, the
"kokutai strategy" was applied to all of the opposition parties except the JCP. The most

probable reason for this is that at the end of the Tanaka Administration, the number of the
Diet persons of the LDP and the total number of the Diet persons of the opposition
parties became almost equal. Therefore, it became necessary for the LDP to establish
amicable relationships with all of the opposition parties except the JCP in order to make
its "kokutai strategy" successful. The opposition parties also welcomed this appeasement
policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is considered a manifestation of amae,
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which is a deep-seated desire for dependent and interdependent relationships typically
institutionalized into the social structure of Japan. It is impossible to detennine how much
money the LDP spent for its kokutai strategy because the LDP did not officially admit
to the fact of giving money to the opposition parties. The statements of politicians are
the only way to verify that this happened and to calculate how much the LDP spend,
realizing that the money they mention is less than the amount of money the LDP spent for
its kokutai strategy.
The former vice chairman of the kokutai of SDPJ, Tsunehiro Kobayashi, writes
as follows:
After I became a vice chairman of kokutai, the opportunity to be invited
to dinner at a first class Japanese restaurant by the kokutai members of the
LDP increased. Every time we were invited, the LDP Diet persons gave
us presents of fruits, with a gift certificate worth a 300,000 yen (about
$3,000) (Minehisa, 1995).
Furthermore, retired LDP Diet person Hamada (1994) wrote as follows:
Every time the opposition Diet persons (except Communists) travel�d
abroad, I or 2 million yen (about $ I 0,000 or 20,000) were given by the
LDP. Moreover, when the LDP and the opposition parties get into an
imbroglio over a significant bill at the committee, over 100 million yen,
(about $1 million) were given to the opposition parties (p. 185).
There is no doubt that the LDP has spent a lot of money in order to pass
important bills. Sato and Kanazashi (1989) estimate that about 340 million yen ($3.4
million) were used for kokutai strategy in 1987. This was the year when the Nakasone
Administration abortively tried to pass the bill on a sales tax. Iwai (1990) estimates that
in 1988, when the LDP tried to pass the bill on the sales tax again, roughly 700 million
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yen ($7 million) were given to the opposition parties. The increase in the amount of
money used for kokutai. can be accounted for as a strong effort to pass the bill submitted
by theLDP.
Funding Sources of theLDP Diet Persons
The last question concerning the relationships between theLDP and the business
community is how the LDP politicians obtain political funds. Sources of funds can be
classified into four categories. Few politicians can depend only upon their own financial
resources for their political activities. Traditionally, financial support from the faction has
been the most important source of funds of the LDP Diet persons (lyasu, 1993).
However, direct business contributions to individual Diet persons are increasing.
Particularly, after 1995, when the revised political fund control law was in effect, this
tendency has become accelerated for reasons that are explained below.
Government support for Diet persons is only for the payment for three secretaries
and for communications, transportation, and hotels. As of 1994, the average amount of
annual government support for a Diet person is about 26 million yen ($260,000)
excluding salaiies (Ohmiya, 1994). Party support does not also become a substantial
portion of the funds of theLDP Diet person. Evel)' Diet person, except those who are
in a minister's post, receives about 2.5 million yen ($25,000) twice a year from the party
(Hirose, 1994, and Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). Besides this, the party gives each Diet
person about 10 million yen ($100,000) in an election year (Hirose, 1994).
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Financial support varies in each faction. Usually, the amount of money that a Diet
person receives from a faction leader per year ranges from 2 million yen($ 20,000)to 5
million yen ($50,000) (Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). Besides the support from faction
leaders, Diet persons receive money from other senior faction members.
It needs to be recognized that these revenues mentioned above are not enough to
provide for all of the political funding that a Diet person requires acknowledging that
these are essential revenue sources for the LOP politicians. The LOP Diet persons
depend more on individual efforts to collect money than on the assistance from the
government, party, and other senior members of the party. Hirose(1994) argues that
funds which are individually raised account for about 60% of their total revenues.
The business community is the main source not only for individual fund raising,
but also fund raising of the party and factions. Among these three ways of fund raising,
contnbutions from the business community to the party is the most "clear and clean" one.
The most orthodox route of this type of contribution is through the National Political
Association (NPA) (Kokumin Seiji Kyokai), which consists of 1,177 large companies.
The original association was formed in 1955 in an attempt to avoid corruption between
the LOP and individual companies.
The political donation to the LOP through the NPA has been about 12 billion yen
(about $120 million) a year since the end of the 1980s(Hirose, 1994, and Iwai, 1990).
During the years of the high-growth of the economy in the 1960s, the major contributors
to the LDP were the steel industry, the electric power industry, and the banks(Curtis,
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1988). These three industries remain high on the list of the contributors to the LDP.
However, the banks are the top contnbutors to the LDP, accounting for 28% of the total
donation through the NPA as of 1992 (Ohmiya, 1994).
As mentioned, the funds collected by individual Diet persons including faction
leaders are greater than the assistance from the party regardless of the legal restrictions
on donations. Until 1994, political contributions from the companies to one Diet person
was limited to under 1.5 million yen (about$15,000) a year. Furthermore, a donation of
over 1 million yen (about$ 10,000) had to be reported to the Home Ministry (Murakami,
1994).
Still, the following two loopholes made this restriction meaningless. First, because
there were no restrictions concerning the number of organizations that one politician can
establish, politicians could establish as many political organizations as needed to collect
as much money as possible. Second, companies could donate more than 1.5 million yen
by dividing the money into a small sums of less than I million yen
The most probable reason for these illegal donations is that it is an effective way
for companies to establish close relationships with politicians by these direct donations
rather than by an indirect donation through the party. Newly developed companies which
do not belong to industrial associations have a strong motivation to donate in this way
because their relationships with the LDP Diet persons are less intimate than companies
of basic industries which have long histories. Curtis (1988) states:
That it is large and that a major source of funds are small, wealthy, and
unincorporated provincial companies, particularly in the real estate and
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construction industries, is not in doubt. . . . Speculation about the
underground political economy is rife precisely because there is little
information available about it--and because scandals erupt frequently
enough to indicate that it really does exists (p. 185).
There are two ways for individual politicians to collect money informally. First,
politicians collect money through political organizations. Those organizations are often
called "koenkai for raising fund" (Shikin koenkai) and consist of business owners.
Second, fund-raising parties are becoming increasingly popular method for collecting
money (See, Curtis, 1988, Fukui & Fukai, 1991, Hirose, 1994, Hrebenar, 1986, and
Kikuchi, 1987).
Most of the LDP Diet persons have their own political organizations which are
used for fund raising. Membership fees of these organizations are usually about only
10,000 yen (about $100) a month. However, a large amount of money can be gathered
by many small contributions. Senior politicians, especially, have a strong ties with the
business community, so they have many members who belong to their political
organizations. For example, former prime minister Noboru Takeshita bad nine political
organizations and collected money which ranges from 300 million yen (about $3 million)
to 500 million yen (about $5 million) a year in each organization (Kikuchi, 1987). Former
prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa had eleven organizations and collected money ranging
from 400 million yen ($4 million) to 1 billion yen (about $10 million) a year in each
organization (Kikuchi, 1987).
This method of collecting funds was very popular until 1994. However, the
revised political fund control law, which was in effect in January 1995, may suppress this
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corrupt way of raising funds in the future. The revised law set a sealing on cooperate
contributions at 500,000 yen (approximately $5,000) a year, and it stipulates that
donations over 50,000 yen (about $500) have to be reported to the Home Ministry.
Moreover, the law says that cooperate contributions to individual politicians will be
abolished in five years, and politicians can establish only one political organization .
Another individual way of collecting money is through fund raising parties.
Politicians will depend more and more on this method in the future because there is no
restriction on party revenue in the current law. Fund raising parties are an imitation of
the American fund raising dinners which became known in the mid-l 970s in Japan. This
is a technique mainly used by LDP politicians (Hrebenar, 1986). This is one of the
manifestations of the close ties between the LDP and the business community.
Faction leaders al-;o have heavily relied on the raising revenue through fundraising
parties. In 1987, then Takeshita faction had a fund raising party to collect about 1.1
billion yen (about $11 million) which accounted for almost half of the annual income of
the Takeshita faction in 1987 (Sone & Kanazashi, 1989).
It has been the responsibility of faction leaders to assist their followers in selling
tickets for their fund raising parties (Hirose, 1994). In 1986, when the elections of two
houses were held, the number of fund raising parties held by both faction leaders and
other politicians was 139 and the total revenue was about 8.7 billion yen (about $87
million) (Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). Considering the fact that the price of one ticket was
only 20,000 yen (about $200) or 30,000 yen (about $300), there was a large number of
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people participating in the parties. Hence, the assistance of facti_on leaders for selling
party tickets must enhance close oyabun-kobun (boss-subordinate) relationships among
faction leaders and their followers.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the enigma of the power of the LDP lies in its relationships with the
business community and with opposition parties. By establishing close reciprocal
relationships with the business community, the LDP obtains ample funds and stable
popular votes. By establishing close reciprocal relationships with opposition parties, the
LDP makes the legislative process smooth and makes its administration stable.
It should be noted that infonnal ties are the basis of these relationships. Informal
meetings of LDP politicians and business leaders at Japanese restaurants provide
opportunities where formal decisions can be made. The LDP zoku (informal policy
support groups) play the role of lobbyists. Furthermore, at the informal organization,
kokutai. (Diet strategy committee), the LDP and opposition parties reach agreements as
to how to amend bills.
Because of maintaining these informal relationships, the LDP and LDP Diet
persons need a lot of money. Most of the money comes from the business community.
A large amount of this money is spent for Diet strategy and maintaining koenkai (personal
support organizations).
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The LDP could maintain a stable one party dominant administration, having
adequate funding and efficient Diet sessions. However, there are two problems with this.
First, the relationships between the LDP and the business community tend to lead to
corruption as can be seen from their frequent scandals. Second, opposition parties are
silenced rather than encouraged to cany out their original responsibilities in criticizing and
evaluating government policy.

CHAPTER V
THE FACTIONS AND THE KOEN.KAI
Introduction
The organizational bases of the LDP were the factions and the Koenkai (personal
support groups). In a private document of the LDP, Nihon no seitou, (1979) (The
political parties in Japan), which was compiled for the purpose of educating party
members, the LDP was characterized as follows:
In each region and community, reliable leaders were elected by Koenkai
members. These leaders, then, formed the factions according to various
human relationships. A loose coalition among these factions resulted in
the LDP (p. 162).
In the previous chapters, the functions of the factions and the koenkai (personal
support groups) were discussed. It was concluded that the factions and the koenkai were
in harmony with traditional Japanese culture in Chapter II. The purpose of this chapter
is to provide an explanation of these two organizations.
The Factions
The factions of the LDP were officially dissolved in 1995. As mentioned in the
second chapter, it is naive to assume that the factions will never again become active.
First, all of the former five faction leaders expressed their desire to maintain relationships
110
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among faction members. Second, the LDP officially dissolved the factions twice, in 1957
and in 1976, in an attempt to strengthen the power of the president of the LDP.
However, the factions came to life again about one year after they were dissolved.
The Structural Changes of the Factions

.. individuals.
The LDP factions were groups that assembled around particular
There were few ideological differences among the factions. The LDP factions were
institutionalized immediately after the emergence of the LDP in 1955 (Beller & Belloni,
1978, and Fukui, 1978). They had their own treasuries, offices, and meeting places. The
factions were composed of Diet persons belonging to both the lower and upper houses.
Most of the LDP Diet persons belonged to the factions. As of 1994, 163 out of the 200
LDP members of the lower house belonged to the factions, and 85 out of the 95 LDP
members of the upper house belonged to factions.
When the factions were officially dissolved in 1995, five factions existed: the
Miyazawa faction, the Obuchi faction, the Mitsuzuka faction, the Watanabe faction, and
the Komoto faction. The name of each factions was the same as the name of each of the
faction leaders. All of these five factions originated in 1955 when the LDP was formed.
Figure 5 indicates a relatively strong continuity and stability of the factions even though
they split frequently in the 1960s. Those splits were caused by the death or retirement of
major faction leaders.
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1960

1970

1980

-----------------------------------------------------------------------Yoshida - Ikeda

Ohira

Sato

Tanaka

Suzuki - Miyazawa Takeshita -Obuchi
Nikaido

Ohno ----.-Murakami---- Mizuta---«
"'-Funada --------Nakagawa
Kishi

�

\

Fukuda ------------------ Abe-Mitsuzuka
Kawashima ------ Shiina Fujiyama -----

Hatoyama-- Kono --� Mori/Sonoda
Ishibashi

Miki

"'Nakasone ------------Watanabe -

----------------------Kornoto

Figure 5. Development of the Factions, 1955-95.
In addition to changes in the number of factions, the characteristics of the factions
also changed. Curtis (1988) said that factional organizations had become less leader
dominated and more collegial structured. This shift was brought about by the generational
change of the faction leaders (Curtis, 1988). No original faction leaders were left a� of
1995. By then all faction leaders had inherited their factions. The faction which experienced
the least number of leadership changes was the Komoto faction. Toshio Komoto, who is
nearly 90 years old, inherited the faction from Takeo Miki who was a founder of the Miki
faction. By contrast, the leadership of the other factions has changed several times.
If an influential and outstanding successor was not found in the faction, a ·collegial
structure ofleadership was formed. For example, when Zenko Suzuki retired as a faction

113
leader in 1983, the senior member of the Suzuki faction, Jun Shiozaki, was to inherit the
faction. However, the relatively young members of the faction were not satisfied with his
leadership. Finally, Kiichi Miyazawa became a faction leader because his leadership was
well evaluated by other members (Iseri, 1988).
The shift from a leader-dominated relationship to a collegial one was also brought
about by the financial independence of faction members. The more members the faction
had, the more funds the faction leaders had to raise. Fukui (1970) wrote that a faction with
more than fifty members imposes an unbearable financial burden on its leader. In 1965,
there were an average of 39 members in each faction. This average increased to about 73
in 1985. As discussed in the previous chapter, the fund raising of an individual Diet person
has become important. Within the factions since the 1980s, the faction leader and other
senior faction members raised funds for the maintenance of the faction (Nakano, 1993).
The ability to raise funds is an important characteristic for a successor to the faction
leadership. Rothacher (1993) said, "The influence of a faction leader declines when his
revenues, which reflect his estimated power, begin to shrink" (p. 22). A member who could
raise more money than a faction leader often succeeded to the leadership of the faction.
The emergence of the Nakasone faction in 1965, and the Tanaka and the Ohira faction in
1971 were examples of this (Kitaoka, 1985). A more recent example is the emergence of
the Takeshita faction in 1986. Noboru Takeshita, who was in the second position in the
Tanaka faction, secretly formed his own faction by providing money to most of the
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members ofthe Tanaka faction. When first generation faction leaders were alive, this type
ofleadership succession did not occur.
The Functions ofthe Factions
The factions existed for 40 years because they were essential not only for the LDP
organization but also for LDP Diet persons themselves. Thayer (1973) pointed out five
functions ofthe factions. First, the leaders ofthe LDP were chosen through the factions.
Second, money was collected and distributed through the factions. Third, governmental
posts and party posts were determined by and through the factions. Fourth, in the election,
candidates were assisted by the factions.

Fifth, the LDP Diet persons received

psychological satisfaction by belonging to the factions. Besides these, dealing with various
kinds of petitions from supporters was an important function of the factions (See, Iseri,
1988, Itakura, 1992, Kikuchi, 1987, and Nakano, 1992). In the following part, these six
functions will be explained
The first function of the factions was to influence the selection of the party
presidents. When the presidential election was held, faction members voted for their leader.
When the president was selected through negotiation and consultation, the informal meeting
of faction leaders was the place where the decision was made.
The leader who obtained the majority support of the Diet persons became the
president of the party. The number of the faction members in one faction was not big
enough to establish the majority control within the party. Therefore, it was necessary for
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the faction leaders to join with another faction to maintain control of the party. In the
process of forming an alliance, severe power struggles often occurred. Money was often
given to Diet persons to buy votes (Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). The former Director
General of the Environment Agency, Masahisa Aoki described the situation that existed
before a presidential election in his reminiscences (1994). Aoki wrote that because there
is no law to prohibit giving money to buy votes in the presidential election, faction leaders
used to give money to the Diet persons who did not belong to their factions openly. He
said that in one election, he received 3 million yen (approximately $30,000) from three
faction leaders.
Severe power struggles in the presidential elections among faction leaders
disappeared since the Nakasone administration (1982-1987) (Sone & Kanazashi, 1989).
After Kakuei Tanaka resigned as a prime minister in 1974, because of the Lockheed
Scandal, he started to expand his faction, and as a result, he wielded power as a "king
maker". The number of members of the Tanaka faction expanded to 140 in the beginning
of the 1980s. By 1982, the average number of members in each faction except the Tanaka
faction was about 60. The dominant power of the Tanaka faction meant that no leader
could become the president without the support of the Tanaka faction. Until 1993, Kakuei
Tanaka and Noboru Takeshita, who took over the Tanaka faction in 1987, played a
significant role in the selection of the presidents. Three presidents, Sousuke Uno (June,
1989-August, 1989), Toshiki Kaifu (August, 1989-November, 1991), and Kiichi Miyazawa
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(November, 1991-August, 1993) were virtually selected by the Takeshita faction (Iseri,
1988).
Kakuei Tanaka could greatly expand his faction because he could raise enough funds
to take care of his followers. Tanaka was one of the first persons to become a zoku Diet
person (Iseri, 1988). While he served as the Finance Minister, the Minister oflntemational
Trade and Industry, the chairman of the PARC and the secretary general before becoming
the prime minister, he established close relationships with various kinds of companies.
Therefore, he could collect formal and informal donations from industries.
The second function of the factions was to raise funds and distribute them to faction
members. As discussed in the previous chapter, the LDP Diet persons spend significant
sums of money not only for election campaigns, but also for maintaining the koenkai. A
faction leader assists his followers not only by giving them money directly but also by
introducing them to influential members of the business community (Thayer, 1973).
However, in the 1980s, when the number of the factions decreased to only five, it
became difficult for faction leaders to provide money to their followers. The decrease in
the number of factions resulted in the increase in the number of the faction members in one
faction. As a result, senior faction members also got involved in the fund raising for the
maintenance of the faction. Nakano (1993) said that it was common for executives of the
faction and members who served as ministers to raise funds by themselves without relying
on a faction leader. Even Tanaka had to rely on other senior faction members financially
after his faction expanded to 104 members.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the political fund control law was revised in
1995 to prohibit the creation of more than one political organization to raise funds. As a
result, it became difficult for faction leaders to raise fund from the business community.
This may have also accelerated the decline in the influence of faction leaders among their
followers.
The third function of the factions was to provide government posts and party posts
to faction members. The assignment of cabinet posts has been the issue to which LDP Diet
persons have paid particular attention.

Cabinet posts have been allocated through

consultations and negotiations among faction leaders. It should be noted that, although the
factions were dissolved on January 1995, cabinet posts were allocated according to the
factional balance in a cabinet reshuffle on August 1995. Cabinet posts were allocated by
a consideration of the size of the factions. "For the LDP, the virtual monopoly of
appointive government jobs has served as a massive stimulus to factionalism " (Fukui, 1978,
p. 50).
As the process of the selection of the president changed in the 1980s, the way to
distribute government posts also changed in the 1980s. In other words, the hegemony of
the Tanaka and the Takeshita factions brought a change in the selection process of cabinet
posts. Until the 1960s, the mainstream factions, which comprised the party's ruling
coalition, dominated the cabinet and party executives' posts (See, Curtis, 1988, Iseri, 1988,
and Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). Conversely, members of the anti mainstream factions at
least could be allocated less important posts.
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All factions have been in the ruling coalition since the 1980s (Curtis, 1988). Under
the existence ofa dominant faction such as the Tanaka and the Takeshita faction, it was
necessary for small factions to join the mainstream factions in order to receive government
and party posts for their members. The Komoto faction, which was the smallest faction
since the 1980s, is an illustration. When Yasuhiro Nakasone formed a new government in
1986, Toshio Komoto asked Nakasone to appoint two members ofthe Komoto faction as
cabinet ministers. However, Nakasone allocated only one ministerial post to the Komoto
faction by eliminating one previous post because the Komoto faction did not support
Nakasone's inauguration as the prime minister. In other words, the Komoto faction lost one
cabinet post because it was an anti mainstream faction.
In the meeting ofthe Komoto faction, many criticisms ofKomoto were expressed
by his followers, arguing that it was a weakness ofKomoto as a faction leader to have failed
to assist his followers in becoming ministers (Kikuchi, 1987).

In the Takeshita

administration (1987-1989), the Komoto faction became a mainstream faction by
supporting Noboru Takeshita. As a result, Komoto could make two of his followers
ministers. This was the only way for Komoto to appease the frustration ofhis followers and
maintain his faction (Kikuchi, 1987).
Because anti-mainstream factions disappeared, power struggles among factions were
reduced in the selection of the the president. On the positive side, it contributed to
establishing friendly relationships among the factions. On the negative side, it reduced the
competitive relationships among the factions. Before the 1980s, when anti-mainstream

119
factions existed, they could criticize party policies and could recommend other policies.
However, those active interrelationships disappeared in the 1980s (Iseri, 1988, and Sone
& Kanazashi, 1989). Simply put, "check and balance" relationships among the factions
were minimized. In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Drano said, "All of
the factions became conservative, and they lost vitality" (Personal communication,
December 28, 1994).
The fourth function of the factions was to support candidates for the lower house
under the multi-member electoral system. This was one of the most important reasons for
the growth and survival of the LDP factions (See, Baerwald, 1986, Fukui, 1970, Iseri,
1988, Rothacher, 1993, and Sone & Kanazashi, 1989). Until 1995, the 511 members of the
lower house were elected from 130 districts which were multi-member constituencies with
only one exception. In each constituency, three, four, or five representatives were elected.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the House of Representatives has the final
voice to elect the prime minister. If a party has a majority of members in the lower house,
a leader of that party becomes the prime minister automatically. Therefore, it was necessary
for the LDP to win at least 256 seats out of 511 seats of the House of Representatives. In
order to capture 256 seats, the LDP had to win an average two seats in each district
because there were only 130 districts. It follows that the LDP candidates had to compete
not only with opposition candidates but also with other LDP candidates. Moreover, the
party supports only one candidate in a district, usually a candidate belonging to the
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dominant faction in a district. Therefore, for other candidates, the factions were the only
organizations on which they could rely in the election.
Besides financial assistance in the election, two other types of assistance were
provided by the factions. The first type of assistance was that the faction helped candidates
to obtain an endorsement from the party (Iseri, 1988, and Thayer, 1973). Not all the
candidates can get an official party nomination. New candidates had particular difficulty
in obtaining endorsements without assistance from the faction. Thus, it was important for
a new candidate to find the faction which allowed him/her to become a member if he/she
wanted to obtain the party endorsement. In an interview with this author, Diet person
Seiko Noda said, "[Before running for the election] I asked Toshio Komoto, a leader of the
Komoto faction, to join his faction, because there were no LDP Diet persons who belonged
to this faction in my district" (Personal communication, December 26, 1994). As can be
seen in her case, the selection of the faction was not based on ideology or policy affiliation,
but on whether or not there is a candidate belonging to that particular faction in that district.
The second type of assistance in the election is to provide help for a candidate's
campaign. A faction leader teaches candidates in campaign strategies such as how to
establish the koenkai and how to make speeches (Kikuchi, 1987). In addition, a faction
leader makes speeches for candidates or their followers. More importantly, a faction leader
mobilizes his own koenkai to collect votes for his candidates or followers (Inoue, 1992).
The election law was revised in 1995. As a result, the election system of the lower
house changed from a multi-member constituency system to a system of single-seat
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constituencies coupled with proportional representation. In this system, an LOP candidate
does not have to compete with other LOP candidates. Therefore, LOP candidates do not
have to rely heavily on the factions in the election. Considering the fact that the multi-seat
constituency system was one of the conditions that enabled the LOP factions to survive,
LOP Diet persons may become more independent than they were.
The fifth function of the factions was to satisfy the psychological and
communication needs of faction members (See, Fukui, 1978, Rothacher, 1993, and Thayer,
1973). In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Drano said, "It is natural for
Diet persons who are congenial to each other to form a group" (Personal communication,
December 28, 1994). Diet person Akira Ohno also said, "If human beings get together, the
factions are formed naturally" (Personal communication, December 24, 1994).
Furthermore, Diet person Seiko Noda said, "The LOP is a huge party. So, it was easy for
the party to convey information to each Diet person. The factions conveyed information
instead of the party headquarters" (Personal communication, December 26, 1994). The first
two Diet persons emphasized the psychological aspects of the function of the factions.
Noda maintained that factions provided for effective communication within the party.
The last function of the factions is to deal with petitions from supporters of Diet
persons. Supporters of Diet persons, especially the koenkai members, made various kinds
of requests to a Diet person. Those include obtaining funds for public construction,
entering children into high schools or colleges, finding jobs for supporters and their family
members, and canceling traffic tickets for supporters (Curtis, 1971, and Itakura, 1992). No
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Diet person is able to satisfy all of these requests from supporters. Therefore, Diet persons
asked their faction leaders to deal with these issues.
Zoku Diet persons (special interest Diet persons) in each faction play a significant
role in dealing with petitions from supporters (Kikuchi, 1987, and Nakano, 1993). For
example, when a Diet person receives a petition to construct a bridge in his district, he/she
consults his/her faction leader and the construction zoku Diet persons in his/her faction.
Then, they put pressure on an appropriate government office and asked other senior Diet
persons to allocate a budget for that project.
The existence of the factions was criticized from within and without the party. The
criticism is that the control of Diet persons by the party headquarters was weakened
because the behavior of the Diet persons were largely influenced by the factions. Related
to this, the leadership of the president, that is the prime minister, was also weakened
(Nakano, 1992, and Thayer, 1973). Faction members worked for their leader in order to
make him the president. Conversely, members expected to be appointed to governmental
and party posts. This is the reason the LOP factions were called "parties in the party".
Existence of the factions, however, had positive aspects. One positive aspect is that
their existence prevented the emergence of a dictator (Kitaoka, 1990). A faction leader
could not wield power if he was not supported by other factions because one faction was
not enough to obtain a majority vote of Diet persons. This "check and balance" relationship
functioned well until the 1970s. As mentioned earlier, once the Tanaka faction expanded

123
its membership to 140 m the 1980s, the relationships among the factions became
unbalanced.
Another positive aspect of factions was that they contributed to the reduction of
conflict among Diet persons (Nakano, 1993). As mentioned, a principle ofLDP decision
making is to reach an unanimous decision. In the event that controversial issues were
discussed in the LDP, each faction leader could persuade his followers who adamantly
opposed party policies to follow the party policies. The close relationships between leaders
and followers, which could be characterized as patron-client relationships, made this
possible.
Diet person Yasuoki Urano pointed out another positive aspect of the factions. In
an interview with this author, he said, "The factions competed with each other to formulate
better policies than other factions" (Personal communication, December 28, 1994). He
stated that if the factions develop the function of policy making, they should continue to
exist.
Considering the functions of the factions and positive aspects of the factions, it is
possible that the LDP factions will be reactivated. As long as the behavior ofLDP Diet
persons is influenced by the Japanese culture, the factions are most likely to become active
agam. Baerwald (1986) stated:
To anticipate or wish that factionalism could or should be eliminated from
the LDP, as its critics so ardently desire, is to expect this political party to
become something other than a Japanese organization (p. 17).

124
The Koenkai and Its Origin
In the lower house election of 1976, Kakuei Tanaka, who was a defendant in the
Lockheed Scandal Case, became a successful candidate by obtaining the largest number of
votes in the district. This otherwise unlikely event was the result of the activities of his
koenkai. Regardless of the nation-wide criticism caused by the scandal, the koenkai
continued to support Tanaka. This was one manifestation of the close relationship between
the koenkai members and a Diet person supported by them. The reasons why koenkai
members are very consistent supporters reqires historical examination.
The koenkai appeared for the first time in 1958, three years after the LDP was
created (Kawato, 1994, and Kitaoka, 1985). As mentioned in the previous chapter, most
Diet persons at present have their koenkai. However, the koenkai ofLDP Diet persons are

•
more active than those for the politicians of the other parties for the following
reasons.
Traditionally, the conservative politicians relied on local notables, usually
landowners, to mobilize the voters. On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party of
Japan (SDPJ) counted on the votes of organized labor while the Komeito (the Clean
Government Party) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) relied mainly on urban dwellers
whose religious and ideological affiliations were identical with the Komeito and JCP
respectively. When there was an election, the only campaign objective of the conservative
politicians was to win the support of the local notables (Kitaoka, 1990, and Thayer, 1973).
All of the voters who lived in the same village voted for the same candidate. Moreover,
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many of the conservative politicians were members of the wealthy families of those local
notables. Thayer (1973) wrote:
Since many of the politicians were sons of one of the leading families in the
district, and since these leading families were intertwined through marriage
•
and otherwise, the prewar politician could rely on his family to gather the
votes. He needed no other organizations (p. 83).
The postwar land reform that expropriated the land and tenancy
destroyed the
.'
traditional support base of the conservative politicians. The leadership of the local notables
in the community was transferred to the public officials in the local government. In
addition, people who lived in the rural areas moved to the cities as the result of the rapid
industrialization after World War II. This population move resulted in the decline of the
number of supporters of the conservative politicians. Conservative politicians could no
longer rely on local notables to gather enough votes to be elected as a Diet person.
Under these circumstances, the koenkai appeared. The koenkai appeared because
LOP politicians had to compensate the local notables for collecting votes. Local politicians,

...
who were leaders of the koenkai, were those who collected the votes for the Diet persons.
One of the basic characteristics of the koenkai was the hierarchically structured networks
among LOP Diet persons and local politicians (Curtis, 1971, and Kawato, 1994).
A characteristic that differentiated the koenkai from the traditional supporters'
groups was that the koenkai were based on direct relationships between candidate and
individual voters (Curtis, 1971, and Kawato, 1994). Curtis ( 1971) wrote that the koenkai
were modem because of "the use of a mass-memberships organization with the function of
organizing large numbers of the general electorate on behalf of a particular Diet candidate"
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(p. 128). When local notables were powerful enough to collect votes for a Diet person, a
Diet person did not have to make an effort to establish personal relationships with voters.
Structure of the Koenkai
The koenkai were divided into several federations which were located at the top of
the hierarchical organization of the koenkai. Each federation had a chief Usually, he/she
was a prefectural assembly person ( Aiba, 1993, and Inoue, 1992). Each federation was
divided into several sections. Each section also had a chief who was usually a local
assembly person (Aiba, 1993, and Inoue, 1992). Each section was divided into several sub
sections. A sub-section chief was usually an influential person in the community. Aiba
(1993) wrote that usually there were about five prefectural assembly persons as federation
chiefs, about 50 municipal, town , or village assembly persons as section chiefs, and about
500 to 1000 local influential persons as sub-section chiefs in one koenkai.
The koenkai were composed of tens of thousands members (Kawato, 1994).
Members were linked through friendships, neighbors, workplaces, professions, school
relationships, families and marriages (Curtis, 1988, and Fukui & Fukai, 1991). Not all of
the koenkai members were active. In an interview with this author, one koenkai member
of Diet person Iwao Matsuda said, "I became a koenkai member because my friend asked
me to join that koenkai. ... To tell the truth, I have voted for socialist candidates"
(Personal communication, December 25, 1994). Kawato (1994) stated that about 40% of
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the koenkai members became members simply because they were solicited to join by their
friends, neighbors, or colleagues.
Besides the hierarchical structure of the koenkai, there were some horizontal
organizations in the koenkai. According to the reminiscences of the former Director
General of the Environment Agency, Masahisa Aoki (1994), his koenkai consisted of 60
organizations such as the elder persons' groups, the young peoples' groups, and the
women's groups. Thayer (1973) wrote that the koenkai ofYasuhiro Nakasone, one of the
oldest and most highly structured, consisted of several parallel organizations such as the
married women's group, the men's group, the group of young men the under thirty, and the
group of young unmarried women.
Koenkai Activities

As mentioned, the ultimate purpose of the koenkai was to mobilize votes. In order
to attain this goal, Diet persons needed to strengthen relationships with koenkai members
not only in the election years but also non-election years. There are three kinds of activities
which are utilized to maintain and expand the koenkai. Those are: (1) obtaining funds from
the government for public works, (2) providing community activities for entertainment and
recreation, and (3) providing personal assistance (Kawato, 1994, and Thayer, 1973).
First, the koenkai members including local politicians ask a LDP Diet person they
are supporting to obtain funds from the government for public works such as the
construction ofnew facilities, road repairs, and constructing train stations. These political
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activities were considered to be the primary obligation of a Diet person to the koenkai
members (Kawato, 1994, Inoue, 1992). As mentioned, it was essential for LDP Diet
persons to belong to factions because faction leaders or senior members of the factions
assisted Diet persons in applying pressure on appropriate government offices to allocate
funds for local public works.
This is a benefit for Diet persons. At the same time it is also a benefit for local
politicians who served as federation chiefs, section chiefs, or sub-section chiefs in the
koenkai. Those local politicians could expand their own koenkai through the networks of
the koenkai of the Diet person they supported. Therefore local politicians worked hard for
the koenkai in order to become chiefs in the koenkai. Inoue (1992) pointed out that it took
about ten years for local politicians to become chiefs in the koenkai.
It should be noted that since the 1980s, two factions, the Tanaka, and the Takeshita
factions, became dominant. These two factions had every type of zoku Diet persons. Diet
persons belonging to these factions had an advantage in applying pressure on the
government offices to allocate funds for public works in their own districts.
Second, providing koenkai members with recreation and entertainment were also
important activities. There were various kinds of activities. Those included: general
membership meetings in which food and drink were served; tennis, volleyball, and quilting
clubs; a chess tournament; and a cooking class. The koenkai also organized tours. Former
LDP Diet person Masahisa Aoki (1994) wrote that his koenkai made trips about 20 times
a year each of which was attended by about 500 members. Aoki wrote that a large amount

129
of money was spent for those trips even though he did not pay all of the expenses of the
participants. On the surface of it, these non-political activities seemed to be meaningless
for Diet persons because these activities are not related to political activities involving the
formulation ofpolicy and studying their own special policy areas. However, these activities
were essential to mobilize koenkai members in the elections. One LDP renegade, who
currently belongs to a new party, said, "While my koenkai members did not work ifl did
not give them entertainment or recreation, members of the Saka Gakkai (the Buddhist
organization which supports the Komeito) worked very hard for me although I offered
nothing to them" (Seisaku, 1995). Viewed in this light, relationships between LDP Diet
persons and their supporters are quite reciprocal.
Third, LDP Diet persons offered personal assistance to the koenkai members.
Kawato (1994) described the various kinds of assistance:
a child's admission to college or the search for a job, gifts for weddings and
condolence money for funerals, good offices in obtaining a business loan,
resolution of traffic accidents or mediation of a quarrel between two
individuals or groups (pp. 177-179).
Curtis ( 1971), observing a election campaign of one LDP Diet person, stated that the
koenkai office was like a "combination employment agency, school placement service,

counseling center and a kind ofsocial club where people may drop in, have a cup of tea, and
talk of elections and politics" (pp. 146-147).
Why do LDP Diet persons spend a lot of time and energy for such activities? The
following episode involving Kakuei Tanaka addresses this question. Shigezo Hayasaka
(1994), who was a secretary of Tanaka, wrote:
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One day, a strange old lady visited our office in Tokyo. No sooner had she
seen Tanaka when she bluntly said, "Kaku (Tanaka's nickname), please call
the highest police officer in Japan to find my son. He [her son] was easily
deceived by an ill-natured woman and [be] ran away with her, leaving his
wife and children.
Then, Tanaka called the Commissioner General and
asked him to find the lady's son. . . . When the lady was leaving, Tanaka
went to the entrance with her and found her shoes and helped her to put
them on. After she left the office, I asked him, ''Why were you so kind to
such a strange old lady ?" He said, "You are stupid. . . . When she returns
to the constituency, she will tell everyone she meets that Tanaka was so
kind that he helped her to put on her shoes. This is good public relations
which costs no money (pp. 117-118).
11 •

•

.

Tanaka's actions were in harmony with the leadership ideal in Japanese society as
described by Chie Nakane (1971). As discussed in Chapter II, Nakane stated that the
vertical relationships between two individuals are the bases of the structural principle of a
group in Japan, and direct personal relationships between an upper and a lower status
individual strengthens the morale of a group. Thus, Nakane claimed that one of the most
important qualifications of a leader in Japanese society depends on his/her ability to
understand and attract his/her followers.

Koenkai activities include both political and non-political activities. Political
activities have been described above. Through non-political activities, LDP Diet persons
expend a great deal of money and energy. Those expenditures, however, were necessary
for LDP Diet persons to maintain and expand
the koenkai. While the relationships between
•
the Diet person and his/her supporters were direct and personal ones, they were in harmony
with Japanese culture, and those relationships also were reciprocal.
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Conclusion
The factions and the koenkai were related to each other. An LDP Diet person relies
mainly on the koenkai during the elections. An LDP Diet person also relied on a faction to
establish and maintain the koenkai not only by receiving financial assistance but also by
asking the leader to help him/her in providing benefits to his/her constituency.
The factions and the koenkai were subject to criticism. The most serious problem
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involving the faction was that the emergence ofdominant factions in the 1980s reduced the
vitality of the LDP. The Tanaka faction and the Takeshita faction, which took over the
Tanaka faction, acquired special privileges in choosing persons for government and party
posts. The competitive relationships among the factions until
• the 1970s gave the LDP
organizational strength based on a "check and balance" system. The problem involving the
koenkai was that LDP Diet persons had to invest a lot oftime with the koenkai. This was

the reason LDP Diet persons did not enthusiastically engage in policy-making themselves.
In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Urano said, "It has been said that Diet
persons have to develop the ability to create policies. . . . However, because elections
occupy our minds, we are always too busy to make policies" (Personal communication,
December 28, 1994).

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Summary
The basic theme ofthis thesis centered on describing the organizations of the LDP
and especially the behavior of LDP Diet persons. In addition, the thesis explored
characteristics of the LDP decision making process and demonstrates that the behaviors
ofLDP Diet persons harmonized with traditional Japanese culture. This latter element
clarified the success of the LDP in amassing significant organizational strength.
In Chapter II, Japanese culture or the psycho characteristics of the Japanese
people were discussed by introducing the works ofthree scholars. They were Benedict,
R. (1946), Nakane, C. (1970), and Doi, T. (1973). Both Benedict and Nakane argued
that groups in Japanese society could be characterized by its hierarchical structure. In
hierarchical relationships among members in a group, and consequently among LDP
politicians, the relationships between superiors and subordinates were reciprocal and their
behaviors were often regulated by the psychological Japanese norms on and giri. On is
the social and psychological debt one incurs upon receiving a favor of major proportions.
Giri is a norm that obliges one to help those who have helped another, or to do favors for
those from whom one has received favors.
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Because of the existence of those norms, LDP Diet persons were closely
connected to each other. Nakane (1970) argued that the higher the degree of the
functioning of vertical relationships, the stronger the degree of the functioning group.
Moreover, she argued that the most stable group consists of two levels of persons, with
each subordinate member at the lower level linked directly to the leader at the upper level.
This study showed that in a hierarchical relationship between a faction leader and
followers, personal and direct relationships tie them to one another. Thus a faction leader
gave money to members of his faction and provided them with government posts and
party posts. In Japanese tradition this is known as on. In return for on, members keeped
making their leaders the president of the party. This act of reciprocity is known as giri.
In addition, hierarchical relationships outside the factions existed between a LDP
Diet person and koenkai members including local politicians. Those relationships were
also personal and direct. Koenkai members collect votes and raise funds for a Diet
person. A Diet person assists his followers among the local politicians in the election by
giving them money and by collecting votes for them. A Diet person also works for other
koenkai members to receive government funding for local projects. Moreover, a Diet
person provides koenkai members with various kinds of personal assistance such as
helping their children gain admission to high school or colleges, finding jobs for them, and
helping them to resolve personal and legal problems.
It is concluded that the interpersonal relationships among LDP Diet persons and
between LDP Diet persons and their followers are the ideal ones in Japanese society.
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Those relationships fulfill the characteristics of ideal relationships among members in a
group portrayed by Nakane. Thus, the interpersonal relationships within the LDP serve
to strengthen the morale of the LDP politicians and to stabilize the organization of the
LDP.
Another useful concept which explains the characteristics of the Japanese was

amae (mutual dependency). Doi (1973) stated that amae was a key concept in
understanding the psychological characteristics of the Japanese. Thus, this concept was
useful in explaining behavior patterns of not only the Japanese but also LDP politicians.
Mutual dependent relationships among the LDP and opposition parties were explained

byamae.
In Chapter III, characteristics of the LDP Diet persons and decision making
organizations were explained.

Moreover, it was determined that decision making

organizations of the LDP functioned by keeping harmony among LDP Diet persons. The
meetings of the three official decision making organs of the LDP, that is, the party
conference, the assembly of the members of both houses of the Diet, and the executive
council, were all ceremonial. A lot of time was consumed in reaching consensus through
negotiation and consultation before issues were brought to official decision making
organs.

Only when there were politically controversial issues, were substantial

discussions held in the executive council. The executive council has a significant role in
the decision making process of the LDP because it gives final approval for the decisions
made by the Political Affairs Research Council (PARC). However, discussions in the
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executive council were often a part of a process to reach unanimous agreement; members
of the executive council often transferred their decision making powers to the president,
or to infonnal meetings of party leaders. These examples clarify the fact that the decision
making process of the LDP was consistent with Japanese culture and the psychological
traits of the Japanese people which center on harmony.
The LDP presidents who exercised significant leadership were exceptional in the
history of the party. Although the Party Law stipulated that the president must be
elected, the president was often selected through consultation among faction leaders.
Maintaining harmony within the party was the first priority in the selection of the
president. This tradition continued even after LDP rule ended. Thus, even before the
presidential election was held in 1995, Yohei Kono, who was the incumbent president,
announced he would not run for reelection. His reason for dropping out was to prevent
a split in the party (Japanese, 1995).
The faction leader supported by the majority of Diet persons became the LDP
president. If a leadership struggle between the two principal contenders ensued, a third
person, who had not intended to become LDP president, would be selected president in
order to sustain harmony among Diet persons. This was just one more example of the
functioning of Japanese political culture.
In Chapter IV, it was explained how the LDP Diet persons collected money and
how it was spent. Close relationships between the business community and the LDP were
clarified. Although the infonnal fund raising activities of the Diet persons had been made
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more difficult by the revision of the political fund control law, the business community is
still the most important source of money for LDP Diet persons. Individual fund raising
methods, such as fund raising parties, however, have become popular among current LDP
Diet persons.
Generally speaking, LDP Diet persons spent money for two major purposes. First
they expended funds for kokutai (Diet strategy committee) to create a smooth legislative
process. The LDP even gave money to the opposition parties when the LDP tried to pass
controversial bills. Second, money was spent to maintain and expand the koenkai
(personal support groups) of LDP Diet persons. This expenditure included not only
money for election campaigns but also money for daily activities such as attending
wedding ceremonies and funerals.
In Chapter V, the organizations of the factions and the koenkai were explained.
Those two organizations were seen to be the bases of the LDP. The koenkai were
essential for LDP politicians to be elected as Diet persons. Relationships between Diet
persons and their followers were personal and direct. Therefore, as mentioned in Chapter
II, the koenkai and thus too the LDP enjoyed considerable stability.
The close relationship between LDP politicians and koenkai members was
maintained because each group received significant benefits. In other words, relationships
always were reciprocal. Koenkai members collected votes and raised funds for Diet
persons. And Diet persons provided koenkai members with various kinds of personal
assistance. In addition, in order to maintain the coherency of the koenkai, a Diet person
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plans trips, parties, and other entertaining activities for the members. Although the
koenkai were constructed as informal organizations, they became vitally important in
assuring LDP control of the government for 38 years.
Although it plays an important role in the Japanese political process, there has
been little criticism of the koenkai. However, there is one problem that needs to be
mentioned. LDP Diet persons are always busy with mundane affairs because of the
demands of koenkai activities. LDP Diet persons take part in tours with koenkai
members. They also attend many funerals and weddings. Therefore, LDP Diet persons
have little time to study and formulate policies. It should also be noted that those
activities were only for koenkai members. LDP Diet persons spend so much of their time
with their koenkai members that they

leave little time for their larger electral

constituency. This may become a serious problem in the future.
The factions were another organizational basis of the LDP. Six functions of the
factions were pointed out. First, the LDP leaders were chosen through the factions.
Second, political funds were collected and distributed through the factions. Third,
governmental and party posts were determined by and through the factions. Fourth, in
the election, candidates were assisted by the faction leaders. Fifth, LDP Diet persons
received a certain degree of psychological satisfaction by belonging to the faction. Sixth,
LDP Diet persons relied on the factions in dealing with various kinds of petitions from
their supporters.
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Although, the factions had important functions, the existence of the factions has
been criticized within and outside the LDP. The most significant reason was that the
factions reduced the extent of the party control over Diet persons. Most important, the
party could not control fund raising and distribution of money. The party also could not
control the allocation of government and party posts.
It has been argued that these characteristics increased incidents of corruption
within the LDP. The faction leaders needed a large amount of money to assist faction
members to both maintain their koenkai and to be elected. The ability to raise funds was
the most important condition in becoming a faction leader. But, political contributions
often are not enough for faction leaders to maintain their factions, therefore, LDP Diet
persons often relied on illegal donations.
Until the 1970s, the factions competed with each other to promote their leaders
for the presidency. Consequently, the LDP was dependent on factional balances. But as
a result of the expansion of the Tanaka faction in the 1980s, competition among the
factions was eliminated. Confronted by a new order of power, faction leaders were
compelled to support the "mainstream" faction. The result was an imbalance among the
factions which reduced the overall organizational strength of the LDP.
In addition, all of the major bribery cases since 1970s, including the Lockheed
Scandal Case, the Recruit Scandal Case, and the Sagawa Express Case, were related to
three leaders of the mainstream factions, i.e., Kakuei Tanaka, Noboru Takeshita, and Shin
Kanemaru. Although not all of the faction leaders and senior Diet persons were involved
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in these bribery cases, the frequency of scandals generated a public belief that the factions
were hotbeds of corruption.
The Current Situation and the Future of the LDP
When LDP rule collapsed on July 1993, no one had anticipated that Prime
Minister Morihiro Hosokawa would be driven from office after only eight months, or that
his successor, Tsutomu Hata, would survive for only two more months. Even less
expected was that a year later the LDP would be back in power as a partner of the Social
Democratic Party of Japan with Tomiichi Murayama as prime minister. In total, Japan
had four prime ministers from 1993 to 1995. Those were the three prime ministers
mentioned above, Hosokawa (August 1993-April 1994), Hata (April 1994-June 1994),
and Murayama (June 1994- ) and Kiichi Miyazawa (November 1991-July 1993), a
predecessor of Hosokawa. Japanese politics has been in an unstable condition since 1993.
Additional splits in the party and new alliances of splinter groups may emerge in the
future.
Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the LDP will reestablish its one party
rule. However, by examining current political and social conditions within Japan, it is
possible to explore the potential for a revival of single party LDP government.
In order to do this, it is necessary to consider whether or not the LDP politicians
still have the support of the koenkai (personal support groups), and to what extent, in
1995, the Japanese people encourage further political experimentation and realignment.
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The Realignment of 1993
It is generally believed that the public criticism of the· LDP which ensued from a
number ofbribery cases was the major reason for the collapse ofLDP rule in 1993. If this
is true, it can be argued that the LDP lost a majority of the seats in the lower house
because the LDP lost the support of the koenkai members. In order to analyze this
argument, it is necessary to review the political situation in 1992 and 1993.
In 1992 and 1993, three conservative politicians, Morihiro Hosokawa, Masayoshi
Takemura, and Ichiro Ozawa, formed the Japan New Party, the Sakigake Party, and the
Shinsei Party respectively. All of them had belonged to the LDP. These personalities
were the key actors who put an end to the 38 year old LDP regime in 1993.
The Japan New Party was formed in 1992 by Morihiro Hosokawa. When this
party was formed, the Tokyo Sagawa Express Company Scandal involving a faction
leader of the Takeshita faction, Shin Kanemaru, generated public attention. In 1992, it
was discovered that Shin Kanemaru, who was the vice president of the LDP, had received
more than $4 million from the Tokyo Sagawa Express Company. This donation was
illegal and violated the Political Funds Control Law. Therefore, he was forced to resign
his party posts and parliamentary membership. Under these circumstances, Hosokawa
formed a new party. He criticized political corruption and the opaque decision making
process of the LDP.
His criticism against LDP politics followed the voices of the times. However, it
should be noted that most of the Diet persons of the Japan New Party were laymen

I
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politically. Diet persons of the Japan New Party were categorized into two types. First,
they were people who could not run as LDP candidates because their career experiences
were not screened or evaluated by the LDP (The Department of Politics of the Asahi
Newspaper, 1993). Second, they were people who longed to be politicians but for no
reason beyond the amassing of personal prestige (The Department of Politics of the Asahi
Newspaper, 1993). In point offact they were all rank amateurs. All of the 35 successful
candidates belonged to the Japan New Party in the 1993 election and were in their first
terms.
The Sakigake Party was formed by 10 LDP renegades led by Masayoshi
Takemura, former Governor of the Shiga prefecture. They also criticized the corruption
within the government and claimed that the election law should be amended. Their
demands were the same as those of the Japan New Party. In fact, Hosokawa and
Takemura consulted each other before they formed new parties. The major difference
between these two parties was that the Japan New Party consisted of amateurs, and the
Sakigake Party consisted of highly professional, former LDP Diet persons. Three of 10
original members of the Sakigake Party were in their first term and the others were in
their second term.
The Shinsei Party was the largest new party and played a decisive role in the •
realignment in 1993. The origin of the Shinsei Party grew out of a conflict within the
Takeshita faction, the largest faction in the LDP at that time. After faction leader
Kanemaru resigned as a Diet person because of a scandal, a conflict occurred over who
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should become the leader of the Takeshita faction. Members of the Takeshita faction
were divided into two groups. One was a group led by lchiro Ozawa, and another one
was a group led by Keizo Obuchi. The latter group, which was larger than the former
one, was also supported by former faction leader, Noboru Takeshita. In this sense,
Ozawa was at a disadvantage in attempting to be a successor ofKanemaru.
It was a group led by Ozawa that vigorously advocated the necessity of political
reform. However, it should be noted that Ozawa was in a close relationship with
Kanemaru. In reality, it was an open secret that Ozawa was also involved in the Tokyo
Sagawa Express Company Scandal. Kawato (1994) stated,
Although they (a group led by Ozawa) were closely connected with
Kanemaru and thus somewhat tainted by his scandal, they claimed to be
intent upon political reform and the realignment of corrupt political
practices (p.122).
It is commonly argued by LDP Diet persons that the Shinsei Party was formed by
Ozawa as a result of a power struggle within the Takeshita faction. In an interview with
this author, Diet person Akira Ohno said that "Ozawa withdrew from the LDP because
it became apparent that he could not become a faction leader" (Personal communication,
December 24, 1994). Diet person Kabun Mutou said, "the emergence of the Shinsei
Party was the result of a power struggle within the Takeshita faction" (Personal
communication, December 18, 1994). Diet person Seiko Noda said, "Politicians are good
at justifying their behavior....No one thinks that the LDP was broken up. It was the
Takeshita faction that was disunited because of the power struggle" (Personal
communication, December 26, 1994). Diet person Yasuoki Urano said,
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It should be noted that it was not until the schism of the Takeshita faction
became clear when Ozawa started to express the necessity of political
reform openly. Until then, he was not so enthusiastic about political
reform. . . . If an election had been held while he (Ozawa) belonged to the
LDP, he and his followers might have been severely damaged. They were
the Diet persons that were in the closest relationships with Kanemaru
(Personal communication, December 28, 1994).
When Ozawa formed the Shinsei Party, 43 LDP Diet persons, 27 of whom were
in their first or second terms, became members of that party. However, not all of them
became members by their own will. Ozawa persuaded young LDP Diet persons to follow
him by suggesting that he would give them support in the election or give them party
posts (Kuroda, 1994). In an interview with this author, Diet person Yasuoki Urano said,
Ozawa coercively brought some Diet persons into his party. Diet person
Eijiro Hata, who is my close friend, said to me, "I was driven into a
corner. Ozawa told me to join his party by telling me that I should repay
on to him. I was supported by Ozawa in the previous election" (Personal
communication, December 26, 1994).
In order to repay on to Ozawa, Eijiro Hata joined the Shinsei Party. Although not all of
the members of the Shinsei Party were forced to became members, it appears Ozawa
aggressively gathered his followers.
As a result of the emergence of three new parties, the number of LDP Diet
persons decreased from 275 to 222. Fifty-three Diet persons left the LDP to join new
parties, and the LDP lost a majority of the seats in the lower house for the first time in 38
years. Immediately after this party split occurred, a no-confidence resolution against the
LDP government was passed. This was followed in July 1993 by the lower house
election. In this election, the LDP failed to obtain a majority of the seats in the lower
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house. Indeed, it controlled only 223 seats. Table 2 indicates that the opposition and
splinter parties which had formed a seven party coalition, not including the Japan
Communist Party (JCP) and the Independent Diet persons, obtained 261 seats. The
coalition consisted ofthe Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), the Shinsei Party, the
Komei Party, the Japan New Party (JNP), the Sakigake Party, the Democratic Socialist
Party (DSP), and the United Democratic Party (UDP).
Table 2
Distribution ofSeats by Party in the Lower House
Date

LDP

Coalition Parties

July 1993

LDP 223

SDPJ 70
Shinsei 55

Other Parties
JCP 15
*IND 12

Komei 51
Japan New Party 35
Sakigake 13
DSP and USP 19
*IND 18
Total 223

Total 261

Total 27

*Note: IND unaffiliated to any parties
Ozawa played a decisive role in forming the coalition by persuading Hosokawa
to align with him. Hosokawa, however, did not decide whether to align with the LDP or
with the Shinsei Party until the last moment. In an interview with this author, Takashi
Kawamura, who is a follower ofHosokawa said,
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I thought that it was only natural that our party allied with the Shinsei
Party. However, I was very surprised by the fact that not only Hosokawa
but also many ofmy colleagues had not decided yet. So, I told Hosokawa
and my colleagues that we should not ally with the LDP because that was
our primal policy (Personal communication, December 19, 1994).
In an interview with this author, Kabun Mutou, who is one of the top party
leaders of the LDP, said,
I tried to persuade Hosokawa and Takemura to form a coalition party
with the LDP.... In reality, there was a possibility of forming a coalition
government of the LDP, the Sakigake Party, and the JNP headed by
Masaharu Gotouda, an influential Diet person who is in a neutral position.
I persuaded Hosokawa to align with the LDP by offering him one of the
top government posts. However, Ozawa persuaded Hosokawa to align
with the Shinsei Party by offering the post of prime minister to him. As
a result, Hosokawa decided to cooperate with Ozawa (Personal
communication, December 18, 1994).
The process of forming a coalition government was not without obstacles. The
1993 realignment of the party was a result of close consultation among conservative
politicians. Kawato (1994) wrote, "It was not the electorate which brought about the
realignment and change of government of 1993 so much as it was the politicians,
especially those who formed the Shinsei Party (p. 123).
Undoubtedly, public criticism against the corruption ofLDP Diet persons was the
driving force for the realignment in 1993. Those criticisms provided incentives for
reform-minded politicians to join the new parties. However, it can be concluded that the
power struggles among conservative politicians accelerated the formation of the new
government.
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It should be noted that the LOP, despite its loss, managed to gain one additional
seat in the lower house election in 1993. No matter how many scandals of LOP Diet
persons were made public, voters continued to favor their LOP Diet persons. It can be
said: the close relationship between the LOP Diet persons and koenkai members was the
key element in this display of solidarity and that the koenkai prevail to this day.
Political Expectations of the People
While splits within the party, and leadership rivalries weakened the LOP, the
collapse of LDP rule can also be attributed to greater popular awareness among the
voting public. Ryuen (1994) wrote that according to the survey conducted by the Asahi
Newspaper in 1993, 70% of the people wanted a change in the government mainly
because they no longer trusted the LOP. However, it should be noted that public opinion
changed between 1993 and 1995. The number of people who desire political stability, and
hence a more conservative approach, is on the increase. According to the survey
conducted by the Asahi Newspaper on June 1995, 47.5% of the people want political
stability first and foremost, while only 39% of them gave it such priority in 1993 (Henka,
1995).
Two major reasons can account for this change in public opinion. First, the
people became tired of the frequent changes in government. It is very rare in developed
countries, and certainly in Japan, for there to be four heads of government in three years.
These frequent realignments alienated the general population, notably because they were

147
the result of power struggles among the parties, each of whom endeavored to win a
majority of the seats in the lower house. Improving the economy of the country and the
life of the people were neglected in these political maneuvers.
Second, Japan experienced both natural disasters as well as violent social unrest
during this period.

In 1995 the nation was shocked, first by the Great Hanshin

Earthquake, and then, just months later, by the terrorist actions of Aum Shinrikyo, a
cultist, religious organization. The first tragedy resulted in the death of several thousand
people. The second was even more disturbing, even though the loss of life was far less,
because it was the act of Japanese citizens determined to destroy not only the governrnent
but also the Japanese nation. Moreover, the image of peaceful harmony, which lies at the
core of Japanese society, was seriously altered by the anarchic actions of the terrorists.
There is little doubt that these factors affected the state of mind of the Japanese
people.

The people learned that strong leadership of the central governrnent was

necessary for the country to recover from the damage of the earthquake and more
important to prevent future terrorist activities.
The Future of the LDP
This study explained the durability of the LDP. As discussed, the interpersonal
relationships among LDP politicians and the direct, personal relationships between LDP
politicians and their supporters, gave the LDP overwhelming strength. Moreover, these
relationships and the decision making process developed by the LDP were consistent with
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Japanese culture as well as the psychological traits of the Japanese people. Because the
Japanese value harmony within the group, they are willing to compromise and seek
consensus in their decision making process. The LDP used these cultural traits to build
a stable political party. In addition, the fact that koenkai support for LDP politicians still
exists is another positive factor that may enable the LDP to regain its power. The fact
that the number of people who want political stability is increasing may also be a positive
factor for the LDP.
The following three conditions are considered essential if the LDP is to regain a
majority of seats in the lower house. The first condition is that the LDP must adapt its
policies to the changing social and economic situations as it did in the 1960s and 1970s.
Among the current major concerns of the Japanese people are economic dislocation and
social malaise. From 1992 to 1994, Japan experienced a near-zero growth in its
economy. Furthermore, Japanese banks currently hold bad debts estimated at about $1
trillion, making the state wide financial situation most unstable. Under these conditions,
many Japanese companies including the largest corporations can no longer guarantee the
Japanese practice of lifetime employment. Lifetime employment is peculiarly Japanese.
Up until the present economic crisis companies recruited workers immediately upon
graduation from high school or college, and these workers continued to work in the same
company until their retirement. Since 1992, about 39% of the Japan's manufacturing
companies have practiced a policy of employment adjustment (Chuma, 1994).
Employment adjustment involves laying off workers, reducing or stopping new hiring and
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cutting working hours. If the government fails to develop an adequate economic policy
to boost the sluggish economy, the LDP will not regain the popular support of the people.
Japan's 1995 economic depression is the most critical issue for the business community,
and certainly for ordinary Japanese citizens.
The second condition is that the LDP needs to find strong candidates and to assist
them in establishing their koenkai. This was the role of the factions until they were
officially dissolved in 1994. The factions competed with each other in order to enable
their members to become successful candidates. This competition provided the LDP with
many skilled and popular Diet persons. Although previous members of the factions are
still maintaining unity as a group, the activities of the factions are restricted. Therefore,
an important function of the faction, which involves the recruiting and supporting of
candidates, has to be done by the party. If the party can not do this, LDP Diet persons
will be motivated to activate the factions again.
The third condition is the most important of the three. It is necessary for the LDP
to maintain the interpersonal relationships that were formed among politicians and
between politicians and their supporters in the 1960s and 1970s. The renewal of such
interpersonal relationships, however, must avoid the corrupt practices of the past. A large
amount money was spent to maintain koenkai by LDP politicians. Hirose (1994)
estimated that from the average expenditure of 100 million yen (about $1 million) spent
by freshman LDP Diet persons, about 44 million yen (about $440,000) were spent for
maintaining the koenkai. Those expenditures included the money that was given at
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funerals and weddings, the money for taking trips, and the money for organizing various
kinds of social activities. As mentioned, those expenditures were essential for LDP Diet
persons in maintaining their koenkai. Although it is impossible to determine the amount
of money that was spent by all LDP politicians to maintain their koenkai, judging by
Hirose's figures, it can be assumed that over 40% of funds were used for that purpose.
It is important to note, however, that the criticism directed toward LDP politicians
for koenkai spending practices has been less intense than that directed against the fund
raising activities and spending practices of the factions. Nevertheless, public criticism of
corruption is too intense to be ignored. Public criticism for the spending practices of LDP
politicians for their koenkai, therefore, can be expected to become more intense in the
future If so, it will be difficult for LDP politicians to collect votes from non-koenkai
members. Therefore, LDP politicians must reconsider their methods of fund raising and
spending practices.
To lessen their dependency on koenkai contributions, LDP politicians must seek
ways to encourage donations from individuals in their larger constituencies. Also, LDP
politicians must expand their spending practices beyond the limits of maintaining the

koenkai. While the koenkai are an indispensable base for winning elections, no politician
can win a seat in the Diet based on their support alone. The establishment of harmony
between the koenkai members and the broader public is essential for LDP politicians
expecting to regain control of the Japanese government.

GLOSSARY
amae

fundamental human need to be dependent

chosakai

investigative commissions

dango

prearranged bidding

gimu

duty

giri

social obligation

ie

household

iinkai

committees

keiretsu

loose corporate groupings

koenkai

personal support groups

Kokumin seiji kyokai

National Political Association

kokutai

Diet strategy committee

nemawashi

a technique used in Japan to avoid conflicts and obtain a
consensus in decision making

oyabun-kobun

boss-subordinate relationships

on

indebtedness

ringi system

a process of decision making by the use of circular letters

shingikai

advisory committees attached to a central government
administrative organ

tokubetsu iinkai

special committees

yakuinkai

the party officials' council
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yakuin renrakukai

the party officials' conference for changing information

zaibatsu

the great family-dominated holding companies

zoku

informal policy support groups
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